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Abstract 
 Three experiments demonstrated undergraduate participants’ abilities to adaptively and 
qualitatively accommodate their encoding strategies to the demands of an upcoming test as they 
gained experience with the test format.  Stimuli were lists of word pairs.  Experiment 1 induced 
test expectancy of either cued recall (of targets given cues) or free recall (of targets only) across 
four study-test cycles of the same test format, then presented participants with a final critical 
cycle featuring either the expected or the unexpected test format.  For final tests of both cued and 
free recall, participants who had expected that test format outperformed those who had not.  This 
disordinal interaction pattern demonstrated not mere differences in effort based on anticipated 
test difficulty, but rather qualitative and appropriate differences in encoding strategies based on 
expected task demands.  The specific ways in which strategies shifted were revealed by final 
associative and item recognition performance and by self-report data.  Participants also came to 
appropriately modulate metacognitive monitoring (Experiment 2) and study-time allocation 
(Experiment 3) across study-test cycles.  Encoding strategies used for cued versus free recall 
were characterized and evaluated, and an account was given to reconcile inconsistent prior 
findings from test expectancy studies. 
 Keywords: encoding strategy, study-time allocation, metacognition, self-regulated 
learning, recall 
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 1 
Introduction 
 Effective studying requires the ability to tailor one’s study behaviors to the foreseeable 
requirements of the test.  The present research examined the extent to which learners are able to 
make qualitative and adaptive changes in the way they learn material after experiencing the 
demands of an upcoming test.  Such learning to learn requires strategic exercise of metacognitive 
control over one’s memory processes. 
 Learners can regulate their study experience to enhance learning in a variety of ways.  
Metamemory research (i.e., research on the metacognition of memory) has focused on the 
control processes of: item selection, study-time allocation, scheduling, and encoding strategy (cf. 
Benjamin, 2008; Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007; Finley, Tullis, & Benjamin, 2010; Serra & 
Metcalfe, 2009).  The current study focused specifically on how learners change their encoding 
strategies for learning words based on how they expect their memory for those words to be 
queried. 
Encoding Strategy 
 Encoding strategy refers to the nature of the processing applied to information that a 
learner wants to remember.  The way in which learners encode information is critical to how that 
information is stored in memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Fisher & Craik, 1977).  This is an 
idea that can be traced back to at least the era of verbal learning research; Eagle and Leiter 
(1964) noted that “the amount and kind of learning that takes place will depend, in large part, 
upon the kind of learning operations that are carried out upon the stimulus material.” 
 Normative efficacy of encoding strategies.  Many studies have investigated the 
normative efficacy of various encoding strategies by attempting to control learners’ strategies via 
direct instructions, orienting tasks, or materials that are more or less conducive to certain 
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strategies.  A rote rehearsal strategy (i.e., overtly or covertly repeating information to oneself) is 
often used as a baseline comparison for the effectiveness of more elaborative strategies (e.g., 
generating associations and/or imagery), with the latter almost always producing superior 
memory performance.  Craik and Lockhart (1972) demonstrated that semantic (“deep”) encoding 
of words, such as judging whether each word fit into a category, led to superior subsequent 
memory compared to more “shallow” encoding, such as making judgments about a word’s font.  
Organizing words into subjectively meaningful groups has been demonstrated as an effective 
strategy for free recall (Tulving, 1966).  Visual imagery has been shown to be effective for 
encoding paired associates (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2006), and may be executed in a variety of 
ways (e.g., forming separate images for a cue and target versus forming a composite or 
interactive image).  Finally, a panoply of mnemonics have been espoused for ages; they vary in 
their complexity (from acronyms and acrostics to the method of loci and the peg word method), 
and vary in their effectiveness depending on task demands (Roediger, 1980). 
 Many of these results can be explained by the concept of transfer-appropriate processing 
(Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977), which holds that effective encoding strategies are those 
that employ cognitive processes at the time of acquisition that are most similar to those processes 
used at the time of retrieval.  Strong support for this general theoretical claim was provided by 
experimental results that demonstrated that “weaker” forms of encoding could actually lead to 
superior memory if the test queried the same aspects of memory as those normatively poorer 
encoding strategies (Blaxton, 1983; Jacoby, 1983; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). 
 Control of encoding strategy.  Thus, much is known about the effectiveness of different 
encoding strategies under various conditions and with various materials, but much less is known 
about how learners employ encoding strategies when left to their own devices, and whether they 
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can adaptively adjust their strategies to meet the demands of a future task.  That is, we know 
little about learners’ metacognitive control of encoding strategies.  In fact, Lundeberg and Fox 
(1991), in assessment of their meta-analysis on test expectancy studies, remarked that “we have 
little clear information on just exactly what students facing a certain kind of test do (that they 
would not do) if facing another kind of test.” 
 There are two basic types of adjustments that learners can make to their encoding 
strategies: quantitative and qualitative.  A learner may apply the same encoding strategy (e.g., 
rote rehearsal) to varying degrees based on the anticipated difficulty of an upcoming test—a 
quantitative change, which could result purely from motivational factors.  Or a learner may apply 
different encoding strategies based on the anticipated format of an upcoming test—a qualitative 
change, which cannot be due to merely trying harder.  As I review below, there has been ample 
evidence of the former, but surprisingly little evidence of the latter. 
Test Expectancy 
 The encoding strategies used by learners are difficult to experimentally investigate 
because, unlike item selection, study-time allocation, and scheduling, such processes are not 
directly observable.  The test expectancy method provides one way to study whether and how 
effectively learners use different encoding strategies for different tasks.  In this methodology, 
participants are led to expect a particular test format (e.g., free recall vs. recognition), either via 
instructions or via experience with a series of tests of the same format.  They are then given a 
final test that consists of either their expected format or the alternative format.  Final test 
performance is compared—separately for each final test format—for participants who had 
expected that format versus participants who had expected the alternate format.  If all other 
forms of metacognitive control (e.g., study-time allocation) are held constant, then performance 
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differences due to the expectancy (aka “mental set”) manipulation reflect differences in the 
encoding strategies employed by participants during study.  Thus, such data allow us to infer 
whether participants tailor their encoding strategies to the demands of a specific expected test 
format. 
 The most prominent finding from studies using this method is that expectation of free 
recall appears to facilitate performance for both free recall and recognition tests.  More 
specifically: a number of studies have shown that participants anticipating a free recall test 
achieve higher performance on tests of both free recall and recognition than do participants 
anticipating a recognition test (Balota & Neely, 1980; d’Ydewalle, Swerts, & de Corte, 1983; 
Hall, Grossman, & Elwood, 1976; Maisto, DeWaard, & Miller, 1977; Meyer 1934; Neely & 
Balota, 1981; Schmidt, 1988; Thiede, 1996). 
 These findings provide ample evidence that learners can make judicious quantitative 
adjustments to their encoding strategies based on anticipated test format.  Yet none of these 
findings can be concluded to reflect qualitative changes in encoding strategy as a function of test 
expectancy.  The pattern of data required for such a conclusion is a disordinal (aka crossover) 
interaction, such that, for both final test formats, learners who expected that format outperform 
those who expected the different format.  Some studies have explicitly sought to detect such an 
interaction, and have failed to find it (e.g., Hall et al., 1976; Jacoby, 1973; Lewis & Wilding, 
1981; Schmidt, 1988).  These data are curiously inconsistent with students’ self-reports that they 
consider different study methods as best suited for different test formats, such focusing on details 
and underlining key terms when preparing for a fill-in-the-blank or true-false test organizing 
main points when preparing for an essay test (Terry, 1933, 1934). 
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 There have been only three test expectancy studies, largely overlooked in the literature, 
that have shown a disordinal interaction of expected test format and received test format that 
may be attributed to differences in encoding strategies.  Von Wright and Meretoja (1975) and 
von Wright (1977) showed such an interaction with serial recall versus recognition.  Postman 
and Jenkins (1948) showed such an interaction with anticipation recall (similar to serial recall) 
versus recognition, and with free recall versus recognition.  These results, discussed further in 
the General Discussion, are the exceptions. 
 Some researchers (e.g., Von Wright & Meretoja, 1975; Kulhavy, Dyer, & Silver, 1975; 
Oakhill & Davies, 1991) have suggested that differences in encoding strategy may not 
necessarily be reflected in overall levels of performance, but may appear as different patterns of 
performance.  Such differences have been found in intra-category serial position functions 
(Carey & Lockhart, 1973; but cf. Hall et al., 1976 for a failure to replicate), overall serial 
position functions (d’Ydewalle, 1981; May & Sande, 1982), source memory (Watanabe, 2003), 
and semantic organization of output in free recall (d’Ydewalle, 1982; Jacoby, 1973).  There is 
even some tentative evidence of different encoding strategies for recognition versus recall from 
functional neuroimaging (Staresina & Davachi, 2006). 
 In summary, the majority of experiments from the test-expectancy literature have 
revealed evidence for only a quantitative difference in encoding strategy between test conditions.  
There is, however, some evidence that learners sometimes employ qualitatively different 
strategies that either do not result in differences in overall performance or that do so only for 
certain test formats, as reviewed further in the General Discussion. 
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Current Study 
 The current study was designed to evaluate learners’ abilities to adaptively and 
qualitatively modify their encoding strategies.  In Experiment 1 I employed the test expectancy 
method using the test formats of cued recall versus free recall, in search of the elusive interaction 
between expected and received test format indicative of qualitative differences in encoding 
strategy.  In Experiment 2 I investigated adaptive changes in metacognitive monitoring 
(measured by judgments of learning) across study-test cycles and test formats, because accurate 
monitoring is necessary to effectively guide control of encoding strategy.  In Experiment 3 I 
sought to train learners to better exercise strategic metacognitive control by providing them 
experience with both test formats and allowing them control over study-time allocation. 
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Experiment 1 
 Across four study-test cycles, participants were induced to expect either cued or free 
recall tests by studying lists of word pairs and receiving the same test format for each list.  Tests 
required recall of target words, either in the presence (cued) or absence (free) of cue words.  A 
final fifth cycle included either the expected or the alternate, unexpected test format.  By using 
two test formats that required production of the same information under qualitatively different 
task demands, I predicted that participants would adopt qualitatively different encoding 
strategies, and that this would result in a disordinal interaction in final recall performance such 
that, for both final test formats, participants who had expected that format would outperform 
participants who had expected the other format.  Using multiple study-test cycles allowed us to 
observe the development of differential strategy use across experience with the test formats.  
Self-report questions and associative and item recognition tests were given after the final recall 
test in order to provide more insight on the nature and development of the encoding strategies 
participants used during the five study-test cycles. 
Method 
 Participants.  One hundred undergraduates (47 female) participated for partial 
fulfillment of course requirements.  Data were not recorded for two additional participants due to 
computer error. 
 Design.  The experiment used a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design with two between-subjects 
variables (expected final test format [cued recall vs. free recall], and received final test format 
[cued recall vs. free recall]) and one within-subjects variable (word pair associative strength 
[high vs. low]).  In addition, the target (right-hand) words of the pairs were counterbalanced 
within-subjects such that half were high frequency (MKF = 51.9, SDKF = 18.9; Kucera & Francis, 
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1967) and half were low frequency (MKF = 17.3, SDKF = 5.1).  Dependent measures were: 
performance on each of five recall tests (either cued recall or free recall), responses to open-
ended self-report questions on encoding strategy use, and performance on a final associative 
recognition test and final item recognition test. 
 Materials.  Materials were 160 English word pairs, divided into five lists of 32 pairs for 
each participant.  All words were 4-8 letter nouns obtained from the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981).  Target words were chosen for high 
imageability (M = 577.3, z = 1.27, SD = 32.0) and high concreteness (M = 576.6, z = 1.16, 
SD = 33.8). 
 The word pairs had a mean forward associative strength of .023 (SD = .005), as obtained 
from the University of South Florida Word Association, Rhyme and Word Fragment Norms 
(Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998).  For each participant, half of the word pairs were 
randomly selected to remain intact (high associative strength, e.g., flight-bird), and the other half 
were transformed into low associative strength pairs  (e.g., trumpet-planet) by randomly 
shuffling the cue words among these pairs such that no target word retained its original cue, and 
the forward associative strength for all of these pairs was zero.  For each participant, word pairs 
were randomly placed into each of the five presentation lists, with the constraint that the two 
levels of associative strength were equally represented in each list. 
 Procedure.  Participants were run individually on computers programmed with Matlab 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997).  All instructions and stimuli were 
presented visually on the computer screen and all participant responses were made using the 
keyboard.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions 
(n = 25 for each group): expected cued recall and received cued recall (C-C), expected cued 
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recall and received free recall (C-F), expected free recall and received cued recall (F-C), and 
expected free recall and received free recall (F-F).  The procedure consisted of: four expectancy-
inducing study-test cycles, a final critical study-test cycle, an open-ended self-report, and two 
recognition tests. 
 Expectancy-inducing study-test cycles.  Participants first read instructions that they 
would be studying a series of word pairs that they would later be tested on.  No details were 
given regarding test format.  Participants were then presented with the first list of 32 word pairs, 
in a randomized order, one pair at a time for 4 s each, with an inter-stimulus interval of 0.5 s.  
They then engaged in an arithmetic distractor task for approximately 45 s.  Finally, participants 
completed a test on the list they had just studied.  The test format was either cued recall or free 
recall, as determined by the expectancy condition to which each participant had been randomly 
assigned. 
 In a cued recall test, participants completed a series of 32 trials, one for each the word 
pairs they had just studied, in a randomized order.  Each test trial showed a cue (left-hand) word 
and instructed participants to type the corresponding target word, or to type a question mark if 
they could not remember the word.  There was no time limit and no feedback was given. 
 In a free recall test, participants saw a screen with 32 empty boxes in which they were 
instructed to type only the target (right-hand) words from the list of word pairs they had just 
studied.  Participants’ responses remained onscreen throughout the test, but participants could 
not go back and edit them.  Participants were instructed to press the enter key repeatedly to cycle 
through all of the remaining empty boxes if they could not remember any more words.  There 
was no time limit and no feedback was given. 
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 Participants completed this entire study-test cycle a total of four times, with a new list of 
word pairs for each cycle, and the same test format for all four cycles.  That is, a given 
participant received either four cued recall cycles or four free recall cycles.  This was intended to 
induce the expectancy that they would receive that same format in a final critical study-test 
cycle. 
 Final critical study-test cycle.  After completing the first four study-test cycles, 
participants completed a final fifth cycle which critically featured either the same test format as 
the previous four (the expected format), or the alternative, unexpected test format, as determined 
by the final test format condition to which each participant had been randomly assigned.  The 
test formats, cued recall and free recall, were as described above. 
 Note that the final list was the same length as the previous four, and presentation was not 
preceded by any special instructions that might alert participants that this would be the last cycle, 
or that anything about the upcoming test might be different.  This is in contrast to some previous 
test expectancy experiments (e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980; Neely & Balota, 1981; Thiede, 1996), 
in which final lists were either much longer than the previous “practice” lists, or participants 
were instructed that they were about to be presented with the final list, or both.  New instructions 
might conceivably prompt participants to alter their encoding strategies, and Leonard and 
Whitten (1983) found that some participants spontaneously reported that they had changed their 
encoding strategy once they realized that the critical list was longer than the previous lists.  Thus, 
the current study did nothing to alert participants that they were practicing for any kind of final 
critical test. 
 Self-report on encoding strategy.  After completing the fifth recall test participants 
responded to two self-report questions.  The first question was: “What did you do to try to 
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remember the words for the tests, and did that change as you proceeded through the tests?”  The 
second question varied by condition.  For participants who had received an unexpected test 
format, the second question was: “You received a final test that was different from the previous 
ones.  How did your experience on that test differ from the others, and what might you have done 
differently to better prepare for that final test?”  For participants who had received an expected 
test format, the second question was: “You received the same type of test throughout the 
experiment.  Looking back, what might you have done differently to better prepare for the final 
test?” There was no time limit for these questions. 
 Recognition tests.  Participants then completed a final associative recognition test 
followed by a final item recognition test.  There had been no prior warning to participants that 
they would receive such tests. 
 The associative recognition test consisted of a series of 80 trials in a random order.  In 
each trial, participants saw a word pair, made a yes/no response to indicate whether or not that 
word pair was in the previously studied lists exactly as shown (i.e., the cue and target correctly 
matched), and gave a confidence rating for their answer (1 = sure, 2 = maybe, 3 = guess).  Half 
of the word pairs from each of the five previously studied lists (an equal number of high and low 
associative strength) were randomly selected for this test, with half of these remaining intact (i.e., 
presented exactly as before) and the other half becoming rearranged lures (i.e., targets paired 
with cues from other pairs in the same list).  There were no words that had not previously been 
presented, and cue and target words always appeared on the same side of a pair as previously 
presented.  There was no time limit and no feedback was given. 
 The item recognition test consisted of a series of 120 trials in a random order.  In each 
trial, participants saw a single word, made a yes/no response to indicate whether or not that word 
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was in the previously studied lists, and gave a confidence rating for their answer (1 = sure, 
2 = maybe, 3 = guess).  There were an equal number (40) of lure words, previously studied cue 
words, and previously studied target words.  Lure words were nouns that had not been previously 
presented and that were similar to the target words in length, imageability, concreteness, and 
frequency.  An equal number of cue words and target words were randomly selected from all 
five previously studied lists and from word pairs of both high and low associative strengths.  No 
words that had appeared in the associative recognition test were reused in the item recognition 
test. There was no time limit and no feedback was given. 
Results and Discussion 
 An alpha level of .05 was used for all tests of statistical significance unless otherwise 
noted.  Effect sizes for comparisons of means are reported as Cohen’s d calculated using the 
pooled standard deviation of the groups being compared (Olejnik & Algina, 2000, Box 1 Option 
B).  Effect sizes for ANOVAs are reported as  calculated using the formulae provided by 
Maxwell and Delaney (2004).  Mauchly’s test was used to detect violations of sphericity for 
within-subjects factors in ANOVAs, and in such cases degrees of freedom were adjusted using 
the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of ε.  For comparisons of means with large differences in 
sample sizes, the Welch-Satterthwaite estimation of degrees of freedom was used. 
 Differences and changes in encoding strategy. 
 Recall on final critical test.  Figure 1 shows mean performance on the final critical recall 
test as a function of received final test format and expected final test format.  The critical 
comparison to make is whether, for both final test formats, participants who had expected that 
format outperformed participants who had expected the other format.  This was indeed the case.  
A 2-way between-subjects ANOVA revealed a reliable disordinal interaction between expected 
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final test format and received final test format, F(1,96)  = 40.28, MSE = .035,  = .28, 
p < .001,  such that on a final cued recall test participants who had expected cued recall (M = .51, 
SD = .26) outperformed participants who had expected free recall (M = .25, SD = .19), 
t(48) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 1.13, and on a final free recall test, participants who had expected free 
recall (M = .27, SD = .16) outperformed participants who had expected cued recall (M = .06, 
SD = .05), t(48) = 6.32, p < .001, d = 1.83. 
 Recall across tests 1-4.  Figure 2 shows mean performance across recall tests 1-4 for 
cued recall versus free recall.  Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.  Higher 
overall performance levels for cued recall, t(98) = 12.42, p < .001, d = 2.51, are expected and 
not of interest; the tests simply differ in their global difficulty.  Of interest is the fact that 
participants receiving repeated free recall tests improved their performance across tests, showing 
a “learning to learn” pattern (Postman, 1964).  This effect was confirmed by separate simple 
linear regressions predicting performance from list number for each participant receiving free 
recall, Mb = 0.019, SDb = 0.043, t(49) = 3.18, p = .003.  Because this improvement was in the 
face of considerable proactive interference, which often leads to decreases in memory 
performance across lists (Wickens, Born, & Allen, 1963), it suggests that these subjects were 
increasingly able to utilize encoding strategies that were suited to the upcoming test.  Cued recall 
performance did not reliably change across lists, Mb = 0.005, SDb = 0.059, t(49) = 0.60, p = .553. 
 Figure 3 and Table 2 show mean performance as a function of list number (1-4), test 
format (cued vs. free), and associative strength (high vs. low).  A 3-way mixed ANOVA 
revealed a reliable 2-way interaction between test format and associative strength, F(1, 
98) = 89.92, MSE = .019, p < .001,  = .079, such that performance was superior for high 
versus low associative strength word pairs to a much greater degree for cued recall (F(1, 
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49) = 162.10, MSE = .027, p < .001,  = .204) than for free recall (F(1, 49) = 5.62, 
MSE = .011, p = .022,  = .018).  There was no reliable 3-way interaction, F(3, 294) = 1.94, 
MSE = .011, p = .123,  < .001, and list number did not interact with associative strength, 
F(3, 294) = 1.17, MSE = .011, p = .320,  < .001.  Thus, as predicted, across all lists, 
associative strength was a very important variable for cued recall but not for free recall. 
 Characterizing the encoding strategies used. 
 Self-reports on encoding strategy.  The mean amount of time spent on the self report was 
158.9 s (SD = 71.3).  A one-way between-subjects ANOVA revealed that this value did not 
reliably differ across conditions, F(3,96)  = 0.68, MSE = 5187.66, p = .568, 
€ 
ˆ ω 2 < .001.  
Participants’ responses to the self-report questions were coded by one of the experimenters using 
a rubric of binary codes devised from the experimenters’ intuitions and from informal 
observation of the range of participants’ responses.  Participants’ experimental conditions were 
concealed during coding. 
 In total, twelve specific strategies were identified and coded (Appendix A).  Table 3 
shows the frequencies of each strategy for both expectancy conditions.  The proportion of 
participants reporting each strategy was compared for cued recall expectation versus free recall 
expectation, using a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of .0042 (i.e., .05/12).  The only two 
strategies for which proportions reliably differed across expectancy were also the most 
frequently reported strategies for each condition.  For participants expecting cued recall, the most 
frequently reported strategy was making cue-target associations (e.g., “I tried to find some 
connection between the two words that were paired”), and this was reported with reliably greater 
frequency than by free-expecting participants (27/50 vs. 9/50, z = 3.75, p < .001).  For 
participants expecting free recall, the most frequently reported strategy was selectively attending 
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to the target words (e.g., “…towards the end I just started memorizing the last word and not 
really paying attention to the first word.”), and this was reported with reliably greater frequency 
than by cued-expecting participants (35/50 vs. 9/50, z = 6.59, p < .001).  One other strategy 
approached significance (7/50 vs. 0/50, z = 2.74, p = .006) in being more frequently reported by 
free-expecting participants: making target-target associations (e.g., “Then I started associating 
the second word from each pair together…”).  Finally, more free-expecting than cued-expecting 
participants reported that they changed strategies across lists (41/50 vs. 17/50, z = 4.86, 
p < .001).  Thus, participants in both expectancy conditions reported having ultimately used 
encoding strategies that were appropriate for the test format they expected, and for free-
expecting participants this appeared to require more shifting from initial strategies. 
 Table 4 shows the frequency data for four common ways in which participants reported 
that they would have changed their encoding strategies to better prepare for the final test.  
Changes such as trying harder or paying more attention overall were not coded.  The most 
frequent response from participants who received a final free recall test (whether expected or 
not) was that they would have focused more on the target words.  Participants who both expected 
and received a final cued recall test reported few changes that they would have made to their 
encoding strategies.  An illustrative example response from a participant who expected cued 
recall but received free recall was: “I didnt remember much on the last test. My word associated 
method did absolutely nothing for me. I would have only looked at the second word and just tried 
to memorize them or associate them with other second words instead.”  Participants who had 
expected a final free recall test but received a final cued recall test reported that they would have 
attended more to the cue words, and/or that they would have made more cue-target associations.  
An illustrative example response from a participant who expected free recall but received cued 
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recall was: “it was easier to recall, but i had become so used to just looking at the second word 
that being given the extra stimuli to remember didnt actually help that much. I think that if I had 
paid more attention to the first words than I would have done better.”  Thus, in both of the 
unexpected conditions, participants reported that they would have made more usage of encoding 
strategies that were appropriate for that unexpected test format. 
 Associative recognition.  Evidence of the encoding strategies reported by participants is 
provided by the results of the recognition tests.  To best elucidate any differences and changes in 
encoding strategies induced by receiving different test formats, I analyzed only recognition data 
from participants who received their expected test format on the final list (i.e., conditions C-C 
and F-F).  Due to computer error, recognition data were not recorded for seven of these 
participants; thus, N = 43 for associative and item recognition analyses (ncued = 21, nfree = 22). 
 Associative recognition performance by cued-expecting participants (Md’ = 2.18, 
SDd’ = 0.84) was reliably greater than that by free-expecting participants (Md’ = 1.15, 
SDd’ = 0.78), t(41) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 1.27.  This is consistent with the cued-expecting 
participants’ greater reports of using a cue-target association strategy; because these participants 
made more efforts to associate cue and target words during encoding, they were better able to 
recognize the correctly associated pairs. 
 Figure 4 and Table 5 show associative recognition performance as a function of test 
expectancy (cued vs. free) and the list number from which the word pairs originated (1-5).  
Separate simple linear regressions for each participant revealed that performance by free-
expecting participants reliably declined across lists of origin, Mb = -0.62, SDb = 1.56, 
t(21) = -2.28, p = .033, while performance by cued-expecting participants did not reliably change 
across lists, Mb = 0.04, SDb = 1.76, t(20) = 0.10, p = .921.  These results are consistent with the 
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free-expecting participants’ greater reports of changing their encoding strategies across lists to 
ones in which less attention was paid to the connection between cues and targets. 
 Item recognition.  Figure 5 shows item recognition performance as a function of test 
expectancy (cued vs. free) and item type (cue vs. target).  A 2-way mixed ANOVA revealed a 
reliable disordinal interaction between test expectancy and item type, F(1,41) = 70.43, 
MSE = .046, p < .001,  = .058.  Cue word recognition performance was greater for cued-
expecting participants (Md’ = 2.28, SDd’ = 1.02) than for free-expecting participants (Md’ = 0.93, 
SDd’ = 0.55), t(41) = 5.23, p < .001, d = 1.66.  Similarly, target word recognition performance 
was greater for cued-expecting participants (Md’ = 1.76, SDd’ = 0.86) than for free-expecting 
participants (Md’ = 1.18, SDd’ = 0.52), t(41) = 2.61, p = .013, d = 0.82.  For cued-expecting 
participants, recognition performance was greater for cue words than for target words, 
t(20) = 7.19, p < .001, d = 0.11, but for free-expecting participants the opposite was true, 
t(21) = -4.34, p < .001, d = -0.10. 
 Cued-expecting participants had seen the cue words twice as many times as the target 
words (once during presentations and once during the recall tests), and twice as many times as 
did the free-expecting participants, so their superior performance on these items was expected.  
The superior target recognition of cued-expecting versus free-expecting participants may be 
explained by cued recall having afforded more successful retrievals of targets than did free recall 
(i.e., the testing effect, cf. Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).  Of key interest is that free-expecting 
participants recognized target words better than cue words.  This is consistent with the free-
expecting participants’ greater reports of selectively attending to the target words; because they 
paid less attention to cue words than target words, they were less able to recognize these. 
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 Figure 6 and Table 6 show item recognition performance as a function of test expectancy 
(cued vs. free), item type (cues vs. targets), and the list number from which the words originated 
(1-5).  Hit rates were used for this analysis because d’ could not be computed by list of origin, 
due to lure words having originated from no previous list by definition.  A 3-way mixed 
ANOVA revealed a reliable 3-way interaction, F(4,164) = 3.50, MSE = .026, p = .009, 
 = .022, such that item type and list number did not interact for cued-expecting 
participants, F(4,80) = 0.14, MSE = .018, p = .968,  < .001, but did interact for free-
expecting participants, F(4,84) = 5.95, MSE = .032, p < .001,  = .085, such that for these 
participants there was a reliable negative linear trend across lists for cues, F(1,21) = 19.51, 
MSE = .036, p < .001,  = .184, but no reliable linear trend across lists for targets, 
F(1,21) = 2.16, MSE = .038, p = .157,  = .014.  For cued-expecting participants, list 
number affected neither hit rate for cues, F(4,80) = 0.67, MSE = .014, p = .618,  < .001, 
nor hit rate for targets, F(4,80) = 0.46, MSE = .030, p = .763,  < .001.  Thus, across lists, 
free-expecting participants showed a steady decline in recognition of cues but not targets, 
consistent with these participants paying less attention to the cue words as they gained 
experience with a task for which cues were not important.  Cued-expecting participants 
consistently paid attention to both cue and target words, as both words were important for the 
task of cued recall. 
 Summary of results.  Taken together, the above results suggest that participants indeed 
came to strategically employ qualitatively different encoding strategies that were appropriate to 
the expected test format.  It appears that most participants began the experiment using some form 
of cue-target association strategy, and that participants receiving cued recall tests continued to 
 19 
use such a strategy, while participants receiving free recall tests gradually abandoned it in favor 
of a target focus strategy (cf. Underwood, 1963). 
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Experiment 2 
 Tailoring an encoding strategy to the demands of an expected test format requires 
learners to attune their awareness to those characteristics of the learning material that are relevant 
to that test format.  Thus, accurate metacognitive monitoring is necessary to effectively guide 
metacognitive control (cf. Hertzog and Dunlosky, 2004).  Given the effective differences and 
changes in encoding strategy observed in Experiment 1, it should also be possible to observe 
adaptive changes in metacognitive monitoring, as measured by judgments of learning (JOLs).  
Thus, I predicted that, across study-test cycles, JOLs would increasingly diverge such that they 
would reflect the associative strength of word pairs to a greater degree for participants expecting 
cued recall (for which associative strength is important) versus participants expecting free recall 
(for which associative strength is irrelevant).  To test this prediction I used a procedure in 
Experiment 2 that was similar to that in Experiment 1, but with JOLs made for each item during 
presentation, and with only four study-test cycles and no conditions that violated test expectancy 
(i.e., no unexpected test formats). 
Method 
 Participants.  One hundred three undergraduates (60 female) participated for partial 
fulfillment of course requirements. 
 Design.  The experiment used a 2 x 2 mixed design with one between-subjects variable 
(expected final test format [cued recall vs. free recall]) and one within-subjects variable (word 
pair associative strength [high vs. low]). In addition, the target (right-hand) words of the pairs 
were counterbalanced within-subjects such that half were high frequency (MKF = 232.0, 
SDKF = 157.3) and half were low frequency (MKF = 3.9, SDKF = 2.6).  Dependent measures were: 
performance on each of four recall tests (either all cued recall or all free recall), responses to a 
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questionnaire on encoding strategy use, and performance on a final associative recognition test 
and final item recognition test. 
 Materials.  Materials were 128 English word pairs (all but three of which were different 
from those used in Experiment 1), divided into four lists of 32 pairs for each participant.  As in 
Experiment 1, all words were 4-8 letter nouns, with target words chosen for high imageability 
(M = 581.9, z = 1.22, SD = 30.2) and high concreteness (M = 579.1, z = 1.18, SD = 33.1).  Mean 
forward associative strength of word pairs was .025 (SD = .005).  For each participant, 
associative strength was manipulated and pairs were placed into lists as described in Experiment 
1. 
 Procedure.  The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, with the major changes 
being the omission of the final critical study-test cycle, and the addition of JOLs during the 
presentation phase of the study-test cycles.  Participants were randomly assigned to receive either 
all cued recall tests (n = 53) or all free recall tests (n = 50).  The procedure consisted of: four 
expectancy-inducing study-test cycles, a questionnaire on encoding strategy use, and two 
recognition tests. 
 Expectancy-inducing study-test cycles.  The four expectancy-inducing study-test cycles 
were identical to those described in Experiment 1 with the addition of JOLs following the 
presentation of each word pair.  After a word pair had been shown for 4 s, the following JOL 
prompt appeared: “How sure are you that you will remember this item on the test?”.  Participants 
responded using a scale ranging from 1 (I am sure I will NOT remember this item.) to 4 (I am 
sure I WILL remember this item.).  The presented word pair remained visible during the 
judgment.  There was no time limit for responding, and each trial was followed by a 0.5 s inter-
stimulus interval. 
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 Questionnaire on encoding strategy.  An encoding strategy questionnaire was devised 
based on the self-report data from Experiment 1 and based on the learning strategy questionnaire 
used by Leonard and Whitten (1983, Appendix) which was in turn adapted from Hall et al. 
(1976).  Participants completed the questionnaire on paper following the fourth study-test cycle.  
For each of 11 specific strategies (listed in Appendix B), participants answered two questions 
“How frequently did you engage in the following study strategies during the experiment so far?” 
to which participants responded on a scale from 1 (no use) to 7 (extensive use); and “When 
during the experiment so far did you use this strategy more frequently?” to which participants 
responded by choosing 1st half, 2nd half, or Same or N/A.  Participants could also write in any 
additional unlisted strategies they had used.  Finally, participants indicated whether they thought 
that the type of test would change over the lists (yes vs. no), and, if yes, they indicated whether 
they stopped suspecting a change during the 1st half, or the 2nd half, or stayed suspicious the 
whole time.  There was no time limit for the questionnaire. 
 Recognition tests.  Participants then completed a final associative recognition test 
followed by a final item recognition test.  The procedure for these tests was the same as that in 
Experiment 1, except that there were 64 trials for the associative recognition test and 96 trials for 
the item recognition test, and no confidence ratings were made.  Again, there was no time limit 
and no feedback was given. 
Results and Discussion 
 Recall performance.  Figure 7 shows mean performance across recall tests 1-4 for cued 
recall versus free recall.  Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.  Separate 
simple linear regressions for each participant revealed that cued recall performance reliably 
declined across lists, Mb = -0.025, SDb = 0.066, t(52) = -2.68, p = .009, while free recall 
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performance, although showing a positive trend, did not reliably change across lists, Mb = 0.013, 
SDb = 0.066, t(49) = 1.37, p = .177. 
 Figure 8 and Table 2 show mean performance as a function of list number (1-4), test 
format (cued vs. free), and associative strength (high vs. low).  A 3-way mixed ANOVA 
revealed a reliable 2-way interaction between test format and associative strength, F(1, 
101) = 104.76, MSE = .026, p < .001,  = .125, such that performance was superior for high 
versus low associative strength word pairs to a much greater degree for cued recall (F(1, 
52) = 181.12, MSE = .044, p < .001,  = .347) than for free recall (F(1, 49) = 31.20, 
MSE = .006, p < .001,  = .048).  There was no reliable 3-way interaction, F(3, 303) = 1.22, 
MSE = .010, p = .301,  < .001, and list number did not interact with associative strength, 
F(3, 303) = 1.91, MSE = .010, p = .127,  = .002.  Thus, as in Experiment 1, across all lists, 
associative strength was a very important variable for cued recall but not for free recall. 
 Metacognitive monitoring.  Figure 9 and Table 7 show mean JOLs as a function of list 
number (1-4), test format (cued vs. free), and associative strength (high vs. low).  A 3-way mixed 
ANOVA revealed a reliable 3-way interaction, F(3, 303) = 6.38, MSE = .046, p < .001, 
 = .006, such that, across lists, the JOLs made by free-expecting participants decreasingly 
differentiated between high and low associative strength pairs (F(2.4, 117.9) = 40.05, 
MSE = .067,  = .802, p < .001,  = .101), and did so to a greater degree than did those 
made by cued-expecting participants (F(2.5, 128.9) = 14.31, MSE = .047,  = .826, p < .001, 
 = .024).  This pattern was further confirmed by performing separate simple linear 
regressions predicting difference scores (mean JOLs for high minus low associative strength) 
from list number for each participant.  The mean JOL difference scores for participants receiving 
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free recall reliably declined across lists, M = -0.22, SD = 0.19, t(49) = 8.28, p < .001.  Although 
this was also true for participants receiving cued recall, M = -0.10, SD = 0.16, t(52) = 4.84, 
p < .001, it happened to a reliably lesser extent than for those receiving free recall, t(101) = 3.34, 
p = .001, d = 0.67.  Free-expecting participants’ JOLs reflected associative strength less and less 
over time, which was appropriate given that this characteristic of the word pairs was not very 
relevant to their task.  Just as with their metacognitive control (encoding strategy), their 
metacognitive monitoring became more attuned to the task. 
 Characterizing the encoding strategies used. 
 Questionnaire on encoding strategy.  To confirm the same patterns of strategy use as 
those suggested by the results of Experiment 1, I consider data from the questionnaire and from 
the two recognition tests.  The mean amount of time spent on the questionnaire was 200.9 s 
(SD = 44.8).  This value did not reliably differ between test format conditions, t(98) = 1.77, 
p = .080, d = 0.36.  Questionnaire data were not recorded for four participants; thus N = 99 for 
the below analyses (ncued = 50, nfree = 49).  Table 8 summarizes participants’ responses.  Figure 
10 shows histograms of participants’ usage frequency ratings for four of the eleven encoding 
strategies as a function of test format (cued vs. free). 
 Because the measure was ordinal, and because the data were not normally distributed, the 
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (which is non-parametric) was used to compare responses 
between cued-expecting and free-expecting participants for each of the 11 strategies (listed in 
Appendix B).  Because these analyses were pre-planned, an unadjusted alpha level was used.  
The response distributions reliably differed as a function of test format for only the four 
strategies shown in Figure 10.  Cued-expecting participants reported more usage of a cue-target 
association strategy (D(99) = .337, z = 1.68, p = .001), while free-expecting participants reported 
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more usage of target-target association (D(99) = .247, z = 1.23, p = .032), target focus 
(D(99) = .336, z = 1.66, p = .001), and rote rehearsal (D(99) = .257, z = 1.28, p = .020). 
 Participants expecting different test formats did not differ in the number of different 
strategies they reported using (i.e., the count of strategies rated > 1), Mcued = 8.7, SDcued = 1.7, 
Mfree = 8.4, SDfree = 2.0, t(97) = 0.87, p = .388, d = 0.18.  This is in contrast to the open-ended 
self-report data from Experiment 1, in which free-expecting participants spontaneously reported 
multiple strategies more often than did cued-expecting participants.  However, consistent with 
the data from Experiment 1, free-expecting participants did reliably report more changes in 
strategy usage than did cued-expecting participants, as measured by the proportion of strategies 
that were rated > 1 for usage and that were also reported as used more in either the 1st half or the 
2nd half of the experiment, Mcued = .37, SDcued = .30, Mfree = 63, SDfree = .27, t(97) = 4.42, 
p < .001, d = 0.90.  Sign tests revealed that free-expecting participants reported more usage in the 
1st half versus the 2nd half of the expectancy-inducing cycles for cue-target association (p = .001), 
and more usage in the 2nd half versus the 1st half for: target focus (p < .001), mental imagery 
(p = .004), intra-item narrative (p = .023), and inter-item narrative (p = .041).  Cued-expecting 
participants reported more usage in the 1st half versus the 2nd half for rote rehearsal (p = .035), 
and more usage in the 2nd half versus the 1st half for personal significance (p = .019). 
 To analyze the self-reports on suspicion about changes in test format, participants were 
classified as either low-suspicion (reporting no suspicion, or reporting that they stopped 
suspecting during the first half of the experiment) or high-suspicion (reporting that they stopped 
suspecting during the second half of the experiment, or reporting that they stayed suspicious the 
whole time).  There were more high-suspicion reports for free recall (41/48) versus cued recall 
(26/50), z = 3.59, p < .001.  For free recall, low-suspicion participants reported more usage of 
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target-target association than did high-suspicion participants, t(7.9)  = 2.85, p = .025, d = 1.30. 
This result suggests that participants who were more convinced that they would receive free 
recall were more willing to adopt an encoding strategy that was appropriate for free recall.  
Usage frequency ratings did not reliably differ by suspicion level for any other encoding 
strategies for free recall, nor for any encoding strategies for cued recall. 
 Associative recognition.  Recognition data were not recorded for three participants; thus 
N = 100 for associative and item recognition analyses (ncued = 51, nfree = 49).  As in Experiment 
1, associative recognition performance by cued-expecting participants (Md’ = 2.33, SDd’ = 0.73) 
was reliably greater than that by free-expecting participants (Md’ = 1.78, SDd’ = 0.78), 
t(98) = 3.58, p < .001, d = 0.72.  Figure 11 and Table 5 show associative recognition 
performance as a function of test expectancy (cued vs. free) and the list number from which the 
word pairs originated (1-4), in Experiment 2.  Separate simple linear regressions for each 
participant revealed that performance by free-expecting participants reliably declined across lists 
of origin, Mb = -0.18, SDb = 0.32, t(48) = -3.88, p < .001, while performance by cued-expecting 
participants did not reliably change across lists, Mb = -0.04, SDb = 0.30, t(50) = -1.06, p = .293.  
These results are consistent with those from Experiment 1, and again indicate cued-expecting 
participants’ greater steady use cue-target association strategies, and free-expecting participants’ 
abandonment of such strategies. 
 Item recognition.  Figure 12 shows item recognition performance (d’) as a function of 
test expectancy (cued vs. free) and item type (cue vs. target).  A 2-way mixed ANOVA revealed 
a reliable disordinal interaction between test expectancy and item type, F(1,98) = 42.53, 
MSE = .112, p < .001,  = .036.  Cue word recognition performance was greater for cued-
expecting participants (Md’ = 2.39, SDd’ = 0.94) than for free-expecting participants (Md’ = 1.17, 
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SDd’ = 0.55), t(98) = 7.42, p < .001, d = 1.49.  Similarly, target word recognition performance 
was greater for cued-expecting participants (Md’ = 1.93, SDd’ = 0.81)  than for free-expecting 
participants (Md’ = 1.33, SDd’ = 0.67), t(98) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 0.80.  For cued-expecting 
participants, recognition performance was greater for cue words than for target words, 
t(50) = 6.84, p < .001, d = 0.07, but for free-expecting participants the opposite was true, 
t(48) = -2.35, p = .023, d = -0.03. 
 Figure 13 and Table 6 show item recognition performance (hit rate) as a function of test 
expectancy (cued vs. free), item type (cues vs. targets), and the list number from which the words 
originated (1-4).  A 3-way mixed ANOVA revealed a reliable 3-way interaction, 
F(3,294) = 10.08, MSE = .021, p < .001,  = .032, such that item type and list number did 
not interact for cued-expecting participants, F(3,150) = 1.38, MSE = .014, p = .252, 
 = .002, but did interact for free-expecting participants, F(3,144) = 11.47, MSE = .028, 
p < .001,  = .080, such that for these participants there was a reliable negative linear trend 
across lists for cues, F(1,48) = 21.86, MSE = .044, p < .001,  = .129, but no reliable linear 
trend for targets, F(1,48) = 1.11, MSE = .023, p = .298,  < .001.  For cued-expecting 
participants, list number affected neither hit rate for cues, F(3,150) = 0.49, MSE = .013, p = .688, 
 < .001, nor hit rate for targets, F(3,150) = 1.17, MSE = .019, p = .322,  = .002.  
These results are again consistent with those from Experiment 1. 
 Efficacy of encoding strategies.  The usage frequency ratings from the questionnaire (to 
the extent that they are accurate) allow us to evaluate the actual efficacy of the various encoding 
strategies at improving recall performance across lists, and to compare that effectiveness for cued 
versus free recall.  I first performed separate simple linear regressions predicting recall 
performance from list number for each participant.  The estimated slopes from these regressions 
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represent the amount of increase (positive slopes) or decrease (negative slopes) in performance 
across lists.  Next I computed Kendall’s tau-b correlations between these slopes and the usage 
frequency ratings for each of the 11 strategies, separately for cued recall and free recall.  These 
correlations indicate the direction and magnitude of the relationship between self-reported use of 
a particular strategy and the amount that recall performance increased or decreased across lists.  
Thus, the correlations represent the efficacy of a given encoding strategy for a given test format. 
 Kendall’s tau-b was used because the usage frequency rating data were ordinal and there 
were many ties.  Data from participants with missing values for any strategies were excluded 
entirely from these analyses, thus ncued = 46 and nfree = 48.  Standard errors were calculated for 
tau-b using the formula provided by Woods (2007, square root of equation 14) with the 
consistent variance estimates defined by Cliff & Charlin (1991).  The standard error used for 
comparison of independent tau-b values was the pooled standard error of the two individual 
standard errors involved: 
€ 
SE ˆ τ b _1
2 + SE ˆ τ b _ 2
2 .  Because these analyses were pre-planned, an 
unadjusted alpha level was used. 
 Table 9 shows estimated tau-b correlation coefficients for cued recall and free recall for 
all 11 encoding strategies, with 95% confidence intervals for each individual coefficient and for 
their difference for each strategy.  For five of the 11 strategies the tau-b correlation coefficients 
significantly differed for cued versus free recall.  Greater self-reported use of a cue-target 
association strategy was associated with increasing performance across cued recall lists but 
decreasing performance across free recall lists.  Greater self-reported use of three strategies was 
not associated with changes in performance across lists for cued recall but was associated with 
increasing performance across free recall lists: target-target association, inter-item association, 
and target focus.  In all three of these cases, the signs of the correlation coefficients were 
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opposite.  Finally, inter-item narrative strategy showed a similar pattern to the previous three 
strategies, but with the same sign for both test formats.  It is also worth noting that greater self-
reported use of a rote rehearsal strategy (on which participants differed as a function of test 
expectancy) was not associated with changes in performance across lists for cued recall or free 
recall, nor were the correlations reliably different. 
 To better elucidate the above patterns, median splits were performed to compare 
performance across lists for participants who reported high versus low usage of each strategy, 
separately for cued recall and free recall.  Because the data on which the split was performed 
were ordinal, there were many ties.  For each cell (e.g., cued-target association: cued recall), data 
from participants whose usage frequency rating matched the median for that cell were either all 
placed in the high usage group or all placed in the low usage group, on the basis of whichever 
grouping would come closest to achieving groups of equal size.  In two cells (target-target 
association: free recall, and inter-item narrative: cued recall), this was not possible and thus data 
from participants with median ratings were omitted from analyses of those two cells (n = 11, 
n = 4, respectively). 
 Figure 14 shows mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-4), test format 
(cued vs. free), and usage (high vs. low) of the six encoding strategies noted above.  Data for all 
eleven strategies are presented in Table 10.  The efficacy of each encoding strategy was 
analyzed—separately for cued versus free recall—by comparing recall performance slopes 
(across lists 1-4) for high versus low usage.  Cue-target association was beneficial for cued 
recall, t(48) = 1.85, p = .070, d = 0.53, but detrimental for free recall, t(47) = -2.30, p = .033, 
d = -0.73.  Target-target association was inconsequential for cued recall, t(48) = -0.21, p = .833, 
d = -0.07, but beneficial for free recall, t(47) = 2.30, p = .026, d = 0.68.  Inter-item association 
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was inconsequential for cued recall, t(48) = -1.10, p = .279, d = -0.33, but beneficial for free 
recall, t(36) = 2.11, p = .042, d = 0.70.  Target focus was inconsequential for cued recall, 
t(48) = 0.18, p = .860, d = 0.05, but beneficial for free recall, t(47) = 3.94, p < .001, d = 1.14.  
Rote rehearsal was inconsequential for both cued recall, t(48) = 0.40, p = .688, d = 0.12, and free 
recall, t(47) = 0.24, p = .813, d = 0.07.  Inter-item narrative was inconsequential for cued recall, 
t(44) = -0.49, p = .624, d = -0.15, but beneficial for free recall, t(47) = 3.14, p = .003, d = 0.93. 
 Effectiveness of metacognitive control.  Having considered results suggestive of which 
encoding strategies were more or less effective for cued versus free recall, we can begin to 
evaluate how effectively participants differentially applied encoding strategies to the two test 
formats.  That is, we may assess how optimal their metacognitive control of encoding strategy 
was. 
 First, it is evident that participants’ metacognitive control was not entirely optimal in the 
free recall condition: even after exposure to the demands of the task in the initial study-test cycle, 
these participants continued to employ unhelpful strategies to some extent, such as cue-target 
association.  To be fair though, it should be noted that participants were not explicitly told in this 
experiment that they would receive the same test format for each list.  Also, free-expecting 
participants did report using cue-target association less as the experiment progressed, and those 
who were less suspicious of a change in test format reported more usage of target-target 
association. 
 A summary of the differential efficacy and use of encoding strategies is shown in Table 
15.  Of the five encoding strategies which were differentially effective for cued versus free recall 
in Experiment 2, participants reported appropriate differences in usage for three of these (cue-
target association, target-target association, and target focus) but apparently did not differentially 
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employ the other two (inter-item association and inter-item narrative) and additionally differed 
on usage for one strategy that was inconsequential for both test formats (rote rehearsal).  Free-
expecting participants reported more usage of rote rehearsal than did cued-expecting participants, 
who reported using this strategy even less in the 2nd half of the experiment. 
 It is possible to quantify participants’ metacognitive control effectiveness, by calculating 
the Pearson correlation between the mean usage frequency rating for each strategy with the 
strategy effectiveness measure for that strategy (tau-b, as described above), separately for cued 
recall and free recall.  The resulting correlation coefficient represents the degree to which 
participants reported greater usage of strategies that were more beneficial for that test format.  
For cued recall, this measure was high (rcued = .71, t(9) = 3.04, p = .014) and for free recall it was 
low (rfree = -.50, t(9) = -1.72, p = .119), zdiff = 2.88, p = .004.  The negative correlation for free-
expecting participants indicates that they reported greater overall usage of encoding strategies 
that were less effective than other strategies at improving performance.  However, this may be 
largely driven by these participants’ early use of cue-target association, before they knew what 
the test format would be like.  This is supported by correlations conditionalized on participants’ 
reporting greater usage in the 1st half of the experiment (rfree_1 = -.55, t(9) = -1.98, p = .079) 
versus the 2nd half of the experiment (rfree_2 = .007, t(9) = 0.02, p = .983), tdiff(8) = 1.42, p = .192. 
 Taken together, these results suggest that participants came equipped with some degree 
of relevant metacognitive knowledge of encoding strategies and were able to employ those 
strategies with some effectiveness, but that there was still room for improvement, especially for 
free recall.  Giving participants experience with both test formats may provide them with the 
opportunity to even further adaptively employ different encoding strategies (cf. Bjork, 
deWinstanley, & Storm, 2007; deWinstanley & Bjork, 2004); this was done in Experiment 3. 
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 Summary of results.  Experiment 2 again showed that participants used qualitatively 
different encoding strategies that were appropriate for their expected test format, and did so to an 
increasing extent as they gained experience with the task.  Furthermore, just as with their 
metacognitive control, their metacognitive monitoring also became more attuned to the demands 
of the tasks. 
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Experiment 3 
 Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence of learners’ adoption of appropriate and 
qualitatively different encoding strategies in expectation of two different test formats, and also 
evidence of learners’ development of more appropriately attuned metacognitive monitoring.  
Given these results, it should be possible to provide learners with an experience that will 
facilitate their learning to better discriminate between the task demands of the two test formats 
and thus also to more strategically control their study process.  Toward this end, in Experiment 3 
I employed a within-subjects design in which all participants experienced three cued recall 
study-test cycles and three free recall study-test cycles, and in which participants were accurately 
informed of the upcoming test format before each study phase.  Furthermore, I investigated 
adaptive changes in control of self-paced study by enabling participants to control study-time 
allocation (i.e., how long they studied each word pair). 
 It was not feasible to use the critical final test manipulation (as in Experiment 1) for 
evidence of differences in encoding strategy in a fully factorial within-subjects design, because 
that would require violating participants’ expectations more than once.  This would be 
problematic because participants—many of whom enter the lab with a default suspicion of 
deception in psychology experiments—are unlikely to fall for the same trick twice.  Thus, I 
chose to rely on questionnaire data and associative recognition performance to provide evidence 
of differences and changes in encoding strategy, and to introduce study-time allocation to 
measure metacognitive control during study. 
 I predicted that participants’ recall performance, questionnaire responses, and associative 
recognition performance would show similar patterns to those observed in Experiments 1 and 2, 
and furthermore that the within-subjects design would engender greater improvement in recall 
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performance than was observed in the between-subjects designs in Experiments 1 and 2.  Finally, 
I also predicted that study-time allocation would also come to reflect important differences 
between the task demands of cued versus free recall: differentiating between high and low 
associative strength for cued recall but not for free recall. 
Method 
 Participants.  Eighty-five undergraduates (44 female) participated for partial fulfillment 
of course requirements. 
 Design.  The experiment used a 2 x 2 within-subjects design, with independent variables: 
expected final test format (cued recall vs. free recall), and word pair associative strength (high 
vs. low).  Dependent measures were: amount of time spent studying each word pair, performance 
on each of six recall tests (three cued recall and three free recall), responses to a questionnaire on 
encoding strategy use, and performance on a final associative recognition test. 
 Materials.  Materials were 144 English word pairs, divided into six lists of 24 pairs for 
each participant.  As before, all words were 4-8 letter nouns, with target words chosen for high 
imageability (M = 578.5, z = 1.19, SD = 34.9) and high concreteness (M = 572.7, z = 1.12, 
SD = 33.4).  Mean target frequency was 55.0 (SDKF = 79.1).  Mean forward associative strength 
of word pairs was .026 (SD = .005).  For each participant, associative strength was manipulated 
and pairs were placed into lists as described in Experiment 1. 
 Procedure.  The procedure consisted of: six expectancy-inducing study-test cycles, a 
questionnaire on encoding strategy use, and one recognition test. 
 Expectancy-inducing study-test cycles.  Participants first read instructions that they 
would be studying several lists of word pairs and that they would have unlimited time to study 
each word pair, but would not be able to return to a pair once they had moved on from it.  The 
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instructions also stated that participants would receive either a cued recall or a free recall test on 
each list after they had finished studying it and before moving on to study the next list.  The 
instructions clearly described both test formats, using an example word pair that did not appear 
in any of the study lists. 
 Participants then completed three cued recall study-test cycles (C) and three free recall 
study-test cycles (F). Participants were randomly assigned to complete these cycles in one of two 
orders: CFCFCF or FCFCFC.  At the start of each cycle, participants read a notification of which 
list number they were about to study, and which test format they would receive for this list, along 
with a reminder of what that test format required.  Participants were then presented with a list of 
24 word pairs, in a randomized order, one pair at a time.  Each word pair remained on the screen 
until participants pressed the space bar, and was followed by an inter-stimulus interval of 0.5 s.  
No JOLs were made, and presentation duration was recorded by the computer for each pair.  
Participants then engaged in an arithmetic distractor task for approximately 45 s.  Finally, 
participants completed a test on the list they had just studied.  The test format that they received 
always matched the test format that they had been told they would receive for that list.  The test 
formats were as described in Experiment 1, with the exception that there were only 24 trials for 
cued recall, and only 24 empty boxes for free recall.  Again, there was no time limit and no 
feedback was given. 
 Questionnaire on encoding strategy.  Participants completed a paper questionnaire that 
was similar to that used in Experiment 2.  For each of the same 11 encoding strategies (Appendix 
B), participants rated their usage frequency from 1 (no use) to 4 (extensive use) for both the cued 
recall lists and the free recall lists.  However, there was no question about when each strategy 
was used most.  The questionnaire did include the same final question regarding suspicion of test 
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format change that was used in Experiment 2.  The questionnaire instructions also reminded 
participants of the definitions of cued recall and free recall. There was no time limit for the 
questionnaire. 
 Recognition test.  Participants then completed a final associative recognition test.  The 
procedure for this test was the same as that in Experiment 1, except that there were only 48 trials 
and no confidence ratings were made. Again, there was no time limit and no feedback was given.  
There was no item recognition test. 
Results and Discussion 
 Recall performance.  Figure 15 shows mean performance across recall tests 1-3 for cued 
recall versus free recall.  Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.  Separate 
simple linear regressions for each participant revealed that cued recall performance reliably 
declined across lists, Mb = -0.025, SDb = 0.089, t(84) = -2.63, p = .010, while free recall 
performance reliably increased across lists, Mb = 0.055, SDb = 0.106, t(84) = 4.74, p < .001. 
 Figure 16 and Table 2 show mean performance as a function of list number (1-3), test 
format (cued vs. free), and associative strength (high vs. low).  A 3-way within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a reliable 2-way interaction between test format and associative strength, F(1, 
84) = 87.05, MSE = .020, p < .001,  = .043, such that performance was superior for high 
versus low associative strength word pairs for cued recall (F(1, 84) = 147.91, MSE = .023, 
p < .001,  = .151), while performance did not reliably differ as a function of associative 
strength for free recall (F(1, 84) = 0.06, MSE = .015, p = .809,  < .001).  There was no 
reliable 3-way interaction, F(2, 168) = 0.39, MSE = .013, p = .681,  < .001, and list 
number did not interact with associative strength, F(2, 168) = 1.12, MSE = .014, p = .329, 
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 < .001.  Thus, across all lists, associative strength was a very important variable for cued 
recall but not for free recall. 
 In order to assess whether recall performance improved more when each participant 
experienced both test formats, two separate ANCOVAs were used (one for cued recall, and one 
for free recall) to compare list 3 recall performance in Experiment 3 versus Experiments 1 and 2, 
while partialing out study time duration and mean recall performance on list 1.  Study time 
duration in each experiment was: 4 s for each word pair in Experiment 1; 4 s plus the JOL 
response time in Experiment 2 (mean of participant median = 5.91 s, SD = 1.04); and determined 
by participants in Experiment 3 (mean of participant median = 4.58 s, SD = 2.39).  The JOL 
response times were not recorded for 19 participants, so study time could only be calculated for 
84 participants from Experiment 2.  One-way ANOVAs confirmed that performance across lists 
1-3 did not reliably differ for the participants excluded from this analysis versus those included, 
neither for cued recall (F(1, 51) = 0.14, MSE = .090, p = .709) nor free recall (F(1, 48) = 1.17, 
MSE = .023, p = .286).  The length of the lists of word pairs in Experiments 1 and 2 was 32, 
while the list length in Experiment 3 was 24.  Shorter list lengths tend to yield higher 
proportional performance in free recall (Murdock, 1962), but this potential effect was accounted 
for by treating each participant’s mean performance on list 1 as a covariate.  The ANCOVA 
contrast revealed that list 3 performance was not reliably different for Experiment 3 versus 
Experiment 1 and 2 for cued recall (F(1, 173) = 0.29, MSE = .029, p = .594,  < .001) but 
was reliably greater for free recall (F(1, 171) = 63.65, MSE = .026, p < .000,  = .009).  
Across experiments, participants seemed to already do well at effectively studying for cued 
recall.  But for free recall, exposure to the explicit pre-presentation instructions and experience 
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with the alternative test format appeared to help participants adaptively change their encoding 
strategies. 
 Study-time allocation.  Analyses of study-time allocation were carried out on 
participants’ median study time (in seconds) per cell.  Figure 17 shows study-time allocation as a 
function of list number (1-3) and test format (cued vs. free).  A 2-way within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a reliable negative linear trend in study-time allocation across lists, F(1, 84) = 38.06, 
MSE = 9.51, p < .001,  = .077, and no difference in study-time allocation for cued versus 
free recall, F(1, 84) = 0.002, MSE = 7.32, p = .960,  < .001.  Participants spent less time 
studying word pairs across lists, but continued to spend about the same studying for cued recall 
and free recall. 
 Figure 18 and Table 11 show study-time allocation as a function of list number (1-3), test 
format (cued vs. free), and associative strength (high vs. low).  A 3-way within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed a reliable 3-way interaction, F(1.6, 137.2) = 4.80, MSE = 1.90,  = .817, p = .015, 
 = .002.  For cued recall, participants consistently spent more time studying low versus 
high associative strength word pairs, as evidenced by a reliable effect of associative strength, 
F(1, 84) = 51.79, MSE = 2.93, p < .001,  = .037, and the lack of a 2-way interaction 
between associative strength and list number, F(1.6, 134.4) = 0.09, MSE = 2.13,  = .800, 
p = .873,  < .001.  For free recall, participants began with the same approach, but 
decreasingly differentiated between high and low associative strength pairs across lists, as 
evidenced by a reliable 2-way interaction between associative strength and the linear effect of list 
number, F(1, 84) = 19.44, MSE = 1.68, p < .001,  = .007. 
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 Characterizing the encoding strategies used. 
 Questionnaire.  To confirm the same patterns of strategy use as those suggested by the 
results of Experiment 1, I consider data from the questionnaire and from the associative 
recognition test.  The mean amount of time spent on the questionnaire was 195.8 s (SD = 41.4). 
Table 12 summarizes participants’ responses.  Figure 19 shows histograms of participants’ usage 
frequency ratings for five of the eleven encoding strategies as a function of test format (cued vs. 
free). 
 Because the usage frequency measure was ordinal, and because the data were not 
normally distributed, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test (which is non-parametric) 
was used to compare participants’ responses for cued recall to their responses for free recall for 
each of the 11 strategies.  Because of the small ordinal scale used, there were many ties and 
potentially many difference scores with a value of zero.  To account for ties, any tied difference 
scores were assigned the mean of the ranks involved in that tie.  Furthermore, the test statistic (z) 
was calculated using the large sample normal approximation with correction for ties as provided 
by Marascuilo and McSweeney (1977, p. 339).  I also employed the correction for continuity 
(Marascuilo & McSweeney, p. 20).  Many sources advise discarding difference scores of zero for 
this test; however, this inflates Type I error rates, especially when there are many zeros.  Thus, I 
retained zeros as described by Marascuilo and McSweeney (p. 334) and Hays (1988, p. 829).  If 
there were an odd number of zeros, one was discarded from analysis.  Remaining zeros were 
ranked along with all other absolute differences and were then treated as any other tied 
differences (i.e., they were all assigned the mean of the ranks involved in their tie).  Finally, half 
of the zeros were assigned a positive sign, and the other half were assigned a negative sign.  This 
formulation of the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test provides the most conservative and 
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accurate comparison test for the type of data I had.  Data from participants with missing values 
were excluded from analysis on a test-wise (i.e., per strategy) basis; thus, n varied slightly across 
tests. 
 Because these analyses were pre-planned, an unadjusted alpha level was used.  The 
response distributions reliably differed as a function of test format for only the five strategies 
shown in Figure 19.  Participants reported more usage in cued recall versus free recall for the 
strategy of cue-target association (n = 83, T = 83, z = 7.65, p < .001).  Participants reported more 
usage in free recall versus cued recall for the strategies of target-target association (n = 81, 
T = 647, z = 4.81, p < .001), target focus (n = 80, T = 259.5, z = 6.61, p < .001), rote rehearsal 
(n = 83, T = 923.5, z = 3.82, p < .001), and inter-item narrative (n = 83, T = 967, z = 3.61, 
p < .001).  These results match those from Experiment 2, with the addition of a reliable 
difference on inter-item narrative.  Furthermore, as in Experiment 2, participants did not differ in 
the number of different strategies they reported using (i.e., the count of strategies rated > 1) for 
cued recall (Mcued = 7.8, SDcued = 2.0) versus free recall (Mfree = 7.8, SDfree = 2.1), t(83) = 0.13, 
p = .899, d = 0.01. 
 Associative recognition.  Recognition data were not recorded for eight participants; thus 
N = 77 for the below analyses.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, associative recognition performance 
for word pairs from cued recall lists (Md’ = 1.74, SDd’ = 0.42) was reliably greater than that for 
word pairs from free recall lists (Md’ = 0.82, SDd’ = 0.52), t(76) = 12.44, p < .001, d = 1.92.  
Figure 20 and Table 5 show associative recognition performance as a function of test format 
(cued vs. free) and the list number from which the word pairs originated (1-3), in Experiment 3.  
Separate simple linear regressions for each participant and each test format revealed that 
performance for word pairs from free recall lists reliably declined across lists of origin, 
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Mb = -0.43, SDb = 0.58, t(76) = -6.48, p < .001, while performance for word pairs from cued 
recall lists did not reliably change across lists, Mb = -0.005, SDb = 0.35, t(76) = -0.11, p = .910.  
This is the same pattern of results found in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 Efficacy of encoding strategies.  The same analytical approach used in Experiment 2 
was employed to evaluate the efficacy of the various encoding strategies at improving recall 
performance across lists, and to compare that effectiveness for cued versus free recall, this time 
within-subjects.  The standard error used for comparison of dependent tau-b values was: 
€ 
SE ˆ τ b _1
2 + SE ˆ τ b _ 2
2 − 2cov( ˆ τ b _1, ˆ τ b _ 2) .  The covariance term was calculated using the formula 
provided by Cliff and Charlin (1991, equation 20, corrected for the erroneously transposed first 
matrix), with the consistent variance estimates. 
 Table 13 shows estimated tau-b correlation coefficients for cued recall and free recall for 
all 11 encoding strategies, with 95% confidence intervals for each individual coefficient and for 
their difference for each strategy.  For three of the 11 strategies the tau-b correlation coefficients 
for cued versus free recall significantly differed, or came close to doing so: target-target 
association, inter-item association, and inter-item narrative.  All three strategies showed negative 
trends for cued recall and positive trends for free recall, suggesting that they were detrimental for 
cued recall and beneficial for free recall.  It is also worth noting that tau-b correlation 
coefficients did not reliably differ for cued versus free recall for three strategies on which 
participants’ usage frequency ratings did reliably vary as a function of test format: cue-target 
association, target focus, and rote rehearsal. 
 Because of the reduced scale used in Experiment 3 (1-4 vs. 1-7 as used in Experiment 2), 
it was not feasible to perform median splits on usage frequency ratings.  Instead, I first 
computed, for each participant, the mean of that participant’s cued recall performance slope 
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across lists and free recall performance slope across lists.  The median of these values was used 
to split participants into a “high improver” group (n = 36) and a “low improver” group (n = 36).  
Data from participants who had any missing values were excluded from analysis. 
 Figure 21 shows, for six encoding strategies, the mean difference in usage frequency 
rating for free versus cued recall, for high improvers versus low improvers. Data for all eleven 
strategies are presented in Table 14.  Cue-target association was reported as used more for cued 
recall versus free recall, and this strategic differentiation of usage was greater for participants 
who improved more across lists of both formats versus participants who improved less across 
lists of both, t(70) = -2.23, p = .029, d = -0.53.  Target-target association was used more in free 
recall, and this to a greater degree for high improvers versus low improvers, t(70) = 2.18, 
p = .033, d = 0.52.  High and low improvers did not reliably differ on their reported differential 
usage of: inter-item association, t(70) = 0.73, p = .467, d = 0.18; target focus, t(70) = -0.40, 
p = .692, d = -0.10; or rote rehearsal, t(70) = -1.01, p = .316, d = -0.24.  Inter-item narrative 
showed the same pattern as target-target association, t(70) = 2.27, p = .021, d = 0.57.  In 
summary, participants whose recall performance improved the most across lists reported greater 
strategic usage of cue-target association (used more for cued vs. free recall), target-target 
association (used more for free vs. cued recall), and inter-item narrative (used more for free vs. 
cued recall). 
 The preceding analyses on strategy effectiveness should be interpreted with some 
caution, because participants were not randomly assigned to use strategies to different extents.  
Nevertheless, the results from Experiments 2 and 3 are suggestive of which strategies were 
helpful for cued recall (cue-target association) versus free recall (target focus, and any 
association across pairs).  Furthermore, these strategies appear to be beneficial for one test 
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format and detrimental for the other.  This significant point will be addressed further in the 
General Discussion. 
 Effectiveness of metacognitive control.  A summary of the differential efficacy and use 
of encoding strategies is shown in Table 15.  Of the three encoding strategies which were 
differentially effective for cued versus free recall in Experiment 3, participants reported 
appropriate differences in usage for two of these (target-target association and inter-item 
narrative) but apparently did not differentially employ the other one (inter-item association).  
Participants reported differences in usage for two more strategies that were found to be 
differentially effective in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 3: cue-target association, and 
target focus.  Finally, participants again reported differential usage for one strategy that was 
inconsequential for both test formats (rote rehearsal, greater reported usage for free recall).  
Overall, participants’ encoding strategy usages appear to be fairly well attuned to the different 
demands of the two test formats, with the salient exceptions being failure to strategically use 
inter-item association, and needless differential usage of rote rehearsal. 
 I again quantified participants’ metacognitive control effectiveness by calculating the 
Pearson correlation between the mean usage frequency rating for each strategy with the strategy 
effectiveness measure for that strategy (tau-b), separately for cued recall and free recall.  For 
cued recall, the correlation was rcued = .27, t(9) = 0.83, p = .428, and for free recall it was 
rfree = .148, t(9) = 0.45, p = .665.  These correlations did not reliably differ, zdiff = 0.22, p = .826.  
Although these metacognitive control effectiveness correlations were lower in Experiment 3 than 
in Experiment 2, perhaps due in part to the smaller rating scale, they did not in fact reliably differ 
across experiments for cued recall (zdiff = 1.24, p = .216) nor for free recall (zdiff = 1.39, p = .165).  
However, the difference in metacognitive control effectiveness correlations for cued versus free 
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recall was marginally reliably lower in Experiment 3 versus Experiment 2, z = 1.73, p = .083.  
That is, there was more parity in metacognitive control effectiveness across test formats in 
Experiment 3 versus Experiment 2.  This was likely due to the within-subjects design, which 
gave participants repeated experience with both test formats. 
 Summary of results.  In Experiment 3 individual participants showed qualitative and 
adaptive differences in encoding strategy and in study-time allocation when they expected two 
different test formats.  Consistent with the results from Experiments 1 and 2, when participants 
studied for cued recall tests across multiple study-test cycles they demonstrated sustained use of 
a cue-target association strategy, and when participants studied for free recall tests across 
multiple study-test cycles they abandoned such a strategy in favor of selectively attending to the 
target word and making associations across pairs.  With regard to study time, participants began 
the experiment by allocating more study time to word pairs with low associative strength when 
expecting either test format.  As shown in Figure 18, participants continued this pattern of 
allocation across cued recall study-test cycles, but decreasingly differentiated between high and 
low associative strength pairs across free recall study-test cycles.  Thus, experience with the 
nature of a specific test format and the effectiveness of their metacognitive control led learners to 
increasingly adopt more effective encoding strategies and study-time allocation strategies.  A 
related finding is that of deWinstanley and Bjork (1994), who found that when participants were 
given a chance to experience the differential performance benefits for generated versus read 
items, they improved their subsequent performance on read items to the level of the generated 
items; this suggests that participants spontaneously, and adaptively, changed the way that they 
processed the read items. 
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General Discussion 
Summary of Results 
 In this study I asked whether learners can adaptively and qualitatively modulate their 
encoding strategies in anticipation of future task demands.  In Experiment 1 participants 
demonstrated that they can and do tailor their encoding strategies to fit the demands of the type 
of test they expect, employing appropriate and qualitatively different strategies for different test 
format.  The key result was a crossover interaction (Figure 1) such that, on final tests of both 
cued recall and free recall, participants who had been led by experience to expect that test format 
outperformed participants who had been led to expect the other format.  In Experiment 2 
participants furthermore demonstrated concomitant and judicious attunement of metacognitive 
monitoring, decreasingly differentiating between high and low associative strength word pairs 
for free recall but not cued recall, as shown in Figure 9.  In Experiment 3, which used a within-
subjects design, participants demonstrated adaptive changes in metacognitive control of 
encoding strategy, and of study-time allocation: participants began the experiment spending 
more time studying word pairs with low versus high associative strength for both test formats, 
and they decreasingly made this distinction for free recall (for which associative strength was 
inconsequential), as shown in Figure 18.  Furthermore, the explicit instructions and experience 
with both test formats provided by Experiment 3 enabled participants to adjust their free recall 
strategies even more adaptively than they had in Experiments 1 and 2.  Finally, all three 
experiments provided insights into the characteristics of the encoding strategies that participants 
used.  In studying for a cued recall test participants relied heavily and consistently on a strategy 
of cue-target association; in studying for a free recall test, participants abandoned cue-target 
association in favor of multiple strategies: selective attention to target words (i.e., target focus), 
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making associations across word pairs (target-target association, inter-item association, and inter-
item narrative), and rote rehearsal.  Participants’ metacognitive control of encoding strategies 
was mostly effective, though not without room for improvement, especially for free recall. 
Relation to Prior Research 
 The present findings are consistent with some prior research.  For example, in studies of 
learning to learn, Postman (1964, 1969) found that several types of recall performance improved 
across unrelated lists as they acclimated to the task.  It is also clear from studies of intentional 
versus incidental learning that knowledge at all of an upcoming test can change the way 
participants encode information, though specific knowledge may do so more potently 
(McDaniel, Blischak, & Challis, 1994).  Furthermore, several researchers have advanced views 
of human memory as a skill that can be improved (cf. Benjamin, 2008; Chase & Ericsson, 1981).  
Ericsson’s work to account for the development of exceptional performance by experts led to the 
theory that, over years of deliberate practice at domain tasks, experts develop specialized 
“retrieval structures” (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) that enable them to rapidly encode and 
subsequently retrieve new information in their specific domain in a way that provides both 
organization and relation to existing knowledge.  Such specialized encoding strategies should be 
learnable by anyone, given enough practice.  For example, Ericsson and Chase (1982) worked 
with an undergraduate, SF, who increased his memory for numbers from a digit span of 7 to 
upwards of 80, all through the spontaneous development of his own mnemonics over hundreds 
of hours of lab testing and practice.  McDaniel and Kearney (1984) instructing participants to use 
different encoding strategies (mental imagery, categorization, and sentence construction) led to 
different patterns of performance for different stimuli and test formats.  This, along with many 
other studies using orienting tasks, demonstrates learners’ abilities to execute a variety of 
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encoding strategies.  Furthermore, when another group of participants was given no orienting 
task, they appeared to generally use the most task-appropriate strategy for the stimuli they 
studied (categorized lists of single words, lists of word pairs, and lists of uncommon words with 
definitions), prompting McDaniel and Kearney to conclude that “mature learners seem to 
spontaneously utilize semantic and imaginal strategies and do so task appropriately.”  Finally, as 
noted in the Introduction, a little-known handful of prior test expectancy experiments have also 
shown some evidence of learners adopting qualitatively different encoding strategies (von 
Wright, 1977; von Wright & Meretoja, 1975; Postman & Jenkins, 1948). 
 All of these lines of research suggest that human learners are capable of flexible and 
adaptive metacognitive control of encoding strategies.  However, such a view is in contrast to the 
many test expectancy experiments that have found overall performance patterns that provide 
only evidence of quantitative differences in encoding strategies (Balota & Neely, 1980; Carey & 
Lockhart, 1973; Connor, 1977, Experiment 1; d’Ydewalle, 1981, 1982; d’Ydewalle et al., 1983; 
Foos & Clark, 1983; Hall et al., 1976; Jacoby, 1973; Lewis and Wilding, 1981; Loftus, 1971; 
Maisto et al., 1977; May & Sande, 1982; Meyer 1934, 1936; Neely & Balota, 1981; Oakhill & 
Davies, 1991; Schmidt, 1988; Thiede, 1996; Tversky, 1973; Wnek & Read, 1980; see also 
Lundeberg & Fox, 1991), or no evidence of differences at all (Feldt, 1990; Freund, Brelsford, & 
Atkinson, 1969; Glass, Clause, & Kreiner, 2007; Kardash & Kroeker, 1989; Kulhavy, Dyer, & 
Silver, 1975; Lovelace, 1973, Experiments 6-9; McDaniel et al., 1994; Rickards & Friedman, 
1978).  In summarizing their findings, Hall et al. (1976) concluded that “a view of the learner as 
a highly active, flexible resourceful strategist … seems to overestimate the degree of control that 
subjects exercise over the nature of their information processing for memory.”  In the sections to 
follow, I explore possible reasons for this conundrum, including the relative value of alternative 
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forms of metacognitive control, prerequisites for effective encoding strategy use, and 
methodological requirements for detecting qualitative changes and differences in encoding 
strategies. 
Alternatives to Adjusting Encoding Strategies 
 It may be that, instead of adjusting their encoding strategies, learners generally rely on 
other forms of metacognitive control, such as item selection, study-time allocation, and 
scheduling, to modulate their learning in order to meet expected demands of an upcoming test.  
The literature on these methods of control suggests that learners do indeed use them strategically 
in the face of varying task demands (cf. Benjamin & Bird, 2006; Finley et al., 2010; Kornell & 
Metcalfe, 2006; Son, 2004; Son & Metcalfe, 2000).  For example, Thiede (1996, Exp. 2), using a 
test expectancy method in which participants controlled study-time allocation, found that 
participants expecting a cued recall test studied longer than those expecting a recognition test.  It 
is also worth observing that, although college students often show keen interest in the format of 
upcoming midterm and final exams, they are more apt to first ask instructors about the content of 
the exams (i.e., “What will be on the test?”), which is a task demand that bears more on item 
selection and study-time allocation than on encoding strategy.  Crooks (1988) concluded that 
“student expectations of the cognitive level [e.g., surface- vs. deep-processing] and content of 
tasks probably exert much more influence on their study behavior and achievement than do their 
expectations of the task format (for given content and cognitive level).” 
 Compared to spending more time studying, being more selective about what is studied, or 
simply putting more effort into using even a modestly generally effective encoding strategy, 
developing and using transfer-appropriate encoding strategies may not be the most cost-effective 
approach to attaining desired levels of memory performance.  According to the conceptual 
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framework proposed by Hertzog and Dunlosky (2004), the demands of such an approach can 
include: appraising the task, retrieving potential strategies, selecting and executing an 
appropriate strategy, monitoring learning, and adjusting strategy use accordingly. 
Prerequisites for Effective Encoding Strategy Use 
 Metacognitive monitoring.  To accommodate their encoding strategies to future test 
conditions, learners must be able to accurately monitor their ongoing learning (e.g., as 
demonstrated in Experiment 2), and also emulate their relevant future cognitive states.  Learners 
may have difficulty assessing the cognitive demands of a future test.  For example, if they under-
appreciate their own rate of forgetting (Koriat & Bjork, 2005), they may underestimate the initial 
degree or depth of encoding that they should seek in order to maximize later retrieval.  A primary 
challenge for learners in this situation is the difficulty of discounting their potentially misleading 
current knowledge state when predicting future performance (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 
1998; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996).  The difficulty of these metacognitive efforts may cause learners 
to struggle with selecting an appropriate encoding strategy, or with adequately applying such a 
strategy.  Thus, giving learners experience with a particular type of learning material and test 
format across multiple study-test cycles (e.g., as opposed to merely giving instructions about an 
upcoming test) may be critical in enabling accurate metacognitive monitoring and control. 
 Metacognitive knowledge.  The effectiveness of self-regulated learning depends in part 
on a learner’s metacognitive knowledge (cf. Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2004; Winne, 1995).  Von 
Wright (1975) observed that “...it is by no means obvious that performance should be optimal 
when the method of testing retention is that anticipated by the subject.  Subjects may not know 
how to encode a material ‘efficiently’ for a particular type of test and may choose their learning 
strategies unwisely.”  In addition to accurate metacognitive monitoring, learners must also be 
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equipped with a repertoire of relevant encoding strategies, or be able to devise new strategies as 
needed.  Free recall is a less constrained task than cued recall, and thus there are a greater 
number of potentially effective encoding strategies that learners could use.  But learners may not 
have prior knowledge of all such strategies, may fail to retrieve them from memory, or may be 
unwilling to commit the resources to an effective but difficult strategy.  This implies that there 
should also be more room for improvement in encoding strategy use for free recall versus cued 
recall, as was observed in Experiments 1-3 of the present study.  Thus, again, experience with a 
leaning task may be critical for enabling development or activation of appropriate knowledge 
(Delaney & Knowles, 2005; Hertzog, Price, & Dunlosky, 2008). 
 Goals, motivation, and beliefs.  Effective use of encoding strategies furthermore 
requires that learners have the goal of attaining high performance on a learning task, are 
motivated enough to pursue that goal, and enabled by the belief that their efforts will be fruitful.  
When learners’ goal is to master learning material, they allocate study-time more strategically 
than when their goal is a much less difficult one (Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 
1999).  Given the effort required to custom tailor encoding strategies to expected test format it is 
likely that learners will not be motivated to go to the trouble if they do not have a goal of high 
performance.  Furthermore, Dweck and colleagues (Dweck, 1986; Elliott & Dweck, 1988) have 
shown that learners who believe intelligence is a fixed trait are less motivated to put effort into 
learning than are learners who believe intelligence is an improvable skill.  Learners may hold a 
variety of beliefs about how memory works (Magnussen et al., 2006), and may have anxieties 
about memory testing that moderate the effects of test expectancy (Minnaert, 2003).  Individual 
differences in goals, motivation, and beliefs are integrated in several accounts of self-regulated 
learning in general by educational researchers (Biggs, 1985; Butler & Winne, 1995; Pintrich, 
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2000; Winne, 2001, 2005; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 1989, 2002).  Two well-
established instruments for measuring the ways in which learners study have also arisen from 
this literature.  The Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI; Weinstein & Palmer, 2002) 
is based on a model of strategic learning with three components: skill, will, and self-regulation.  
The Study Process Questionnaire (SPQ; Biggs, Kember, & Leung, 2001) is based on measuring 
both motives and strategies across three overall approaches to learning: surface, deep, and 
achieving.  Finally, Hertzog and Dunlosky (2004) proposed a conceptual framework that ties 
together studies on strategic behavior in associative learning tasks.  In their framework, as in 
models from the self-regulated learning literature, learners’ epistemologies and performance 
goals are de facto prerequisites for adaptive encoding strategy use. 
Methodological Requirements for Detecting Qualitative Changes and Differences in 
Encoding Strategy 
When the prerequisites above are all satisfied, and when alternative forms of 
metacognitive control are either unavailable or insufficient, learners may indeed use qualitatively 
different encoding strategies that are effective for the particular type of test they expect.  
However, there are several methodological (aka situational) requirements that must be met in 
order to detect qualitative changes and differences in encoding strategy as a function of test 
expectancy, particularly in order to detect the distinctive and elusive disordinal interaction 
between test format expected and test format received.  I outline these requirements as follows: 
1. Task demands for the two (or more) test types must be different enough that a single 
encoding strategy does not suffice for attaining performance goals across test types.  
Conflicting task demands best meet this requirement. 
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2. Stimuli and method of presentation must sufficiently allow for variability in the ways 
that items can be encoded. 
3. Dependent measures must be sufficiently sensitive and appropriate to detect 
differences in encoding strategies that are relevant to the task demands. 
I will now consider how these methodological requirements help to explain the discrepant 
findings in studies using test expectancy methods. 
 Task demands.  The first methodological requirement, which was also suggested by 
Sanders and Tzeng (1975), is that task demands for the two (or more) test types be different 
enough that a single encoding strategy does not suffice for attaining performance goals across 
test types.  This requirement may play a large role in the widespread failure to find a disordinal 
interaction between test format expected and test format received for free recall versus 
recognition.  Hall et al. (1976) found that participants expecting either of these test formats self-
reported predominant use of associative and imagery strategies, and that for both test formats 
there was a positive correlation between how extensively a participant used either type of 
strategy (as self-rated on a 1 to 7 scale) and that participant’s test performance.  That is, the same 
encoding strategies were beneficial for free recall and recognition.  Thus, free recall and 
recognition may overlap too much in their task demands to prompt qualitative differences in 
encoding strategy.  Drawing on the theoretical model of Anderson and Bower (1974), Maisto et 
al. (1977) stated that “testing conditions can be varied so that optimal encoding for recall and 
recognition overlap to a large extent.”  In terms of the framework proposed by Hunt and 
McDaniel (1993), the task demands of both free recall and recognition call for predominantly 
distinctive processing. 
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 The methodological requirement of differing task demands may similarly speak to 
Jacoby’s (1973) failure to find a disordinal interaction, despite pitting cued recall against free 
recall and inducing expectancy via multiple study-test cycles (as in Experiment 1 of the present 
study).  In Jacoby’s experiment, the items presented were single words, each of which shared a 
semantic category with six other words in a given list.  The cues given in cued recall were the 
category names.  Thus, each cue was tied to seven different targets.  Requiring participants to 
recall multiple specific targets from a given category may have shifted the most appropriate 
encoding strategy away from predominantly cue-target relational processing toward more 
distinctive processing and/or target-target relational processing, both of which would also be 
appropriate for free recall. 
 Finally, the requirement of differing task demands may explain, in part, the success of the 
few studies that have found evidence of qualitative differences in encoding strategies.  In the 
present study, the correlational analyses of encoding strategy effectiveness in Experiments 2 and 
3 clearly demonstrated that not only were different strategies beneficial for cued recall (cue-
target association) versus free recall (e.g., target focus, target-target association), but furthermore 
that some strategies that were beneficial for one test format were detrimental for the other 
format.  Thus, the task demands of the two test formats, as implemented in the present study, 
were conflicting. 
 In the studies by von Wright (1977) and von Wright and Meretoja (1975), the disordinal 
interaction was found for serial recall versus recognition, but not for free recall versus 
recognition nor for free recall versus serial recall.  Serial recall, while similar in task demands to 
free recall (cf. Bhatarah, Ward, & Tan, 2008), was likely more different from recognition than 
free recall was.  The specificity of the task demands of serial recall (i.e., outputting items in the 
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same order as they were presented) may have led participants to employ a serial association 
encoding strategy, which would be beneficial for serial and free recall but not for recognition 
(which would benefit more from distinctive rather than relational encoding strategies). 
 In order to explain the lone result showing a disordinal interaction for free recall versus 
recognition (Postman & Jenkins, 1948), along with many other results, we must turn to the 
second methodological requirement. 
 Stimuli and presentation.  The second methodological requirement—stimuli and 
presentation that allow for variability in encoding—was pointed out by Tversky (1973) as an 
advantage of picture stimuli, which can be encoded visually and/or verbally (see also Peeck, Van 
Dam, & de Jong, 1978).  Balota and Neely (1980) also spoke to this issue in proposing that test 
expectancy effects are attenuated to the extent that stimuli restrict free-recall-expecting 
participants from doing more variable encoding than recognition-expecting participants (e.g., 
when low frequency words are used, providing fewer potential meanings to leverage for 
encoding; see also May & Sande, 1982).  Semantic organization of word lists has also been 
found to interact with expected test format (Connor, 1977; Neely & Balota, 1981; Schmidt, 
1988). 
 The stimuli and presentation requirement potentially explains why the inducement of 
expectancy using instructions alone, or only using only one practice test, often does not result in 
test expectancy effects: participants have not been given enough experience or opportunity to 
develop or select differentiated encoding strategies.  That experience with a test format is more 
effective at inducing test expectancy than instructions alone was noted in the meta-analysis by 
Lundberg and Fox (1991) for multiple choice tests in classroom studies, and was also noted by 
McDaniel et al. (1994) for laboratory studies that used prose material.  Hall et al. (1976), in 
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laboratory studies using word lists, found a small effect of test expectancy using instructions 
alone (Experiment 2), but greater effects using practice tests (Experiments 1 & 3).  Furthermore, 
in their third experiment Hall et al. found a test expectancy effect when the total time participants 
were given to study 28 words was longer (180 s) but not when it was shorter (90 s).  Balota and 
Neely (1980) also argued that failures to find test expectancy effects on recognition performance 
may be due to insufficient practice. 
 The stimuli and presentation requirement again helps explain the few studies that have 
found evidence of qualitative differences in encoding strategies.  The present study used word 
pairs as stimuli, in order to accommodate the use of cued recall.  Word pairs afford more 
potential variation in encoding strategy than single words, which have been used as stimuli in 
most prior test expectancy studies using discrete material.  Furthermore, experiments in the 
present study induced test expectancy over the course of three or four practice study-test cycles, 
which apparently provided participants with adequate experience to cater their encoding 
strategies to their expected test format. 
 The studies by von Wright (1977) and von Wright and Meretoja (1975) used picture 
stimuli (drawings of objects), which, as noted above, likely provide for more varied encoding 
than words.  Furthermore, although these two studies induced expectancy for test format by 
instructions alone, they did something which almost no other test expectancy studies have done: 
used multiple presentations.  Items were presented four times for 3 s each in von Wright and 
Meretoja and two times for 3 s each in von Wright.  Von Wright reported that the effects of test 
expectancy in his experiment were smaller than those found in von Wright and Meretoja, and 
commented that “this is presumably due to the fact that while a set of fairly elaborate pictures, 
providing good opportunity for differential encoding, was used in the former study, the pictures 
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in the present experiment were both fewer and simpler.”  The later study also used fewer 
presentation repetitions. 
 The study by Postman and Jenkins (1948) used adjective words as stimuli and induced 
expectancy by instructions alone, neither of which should have facilitated differential encoding 
under the present conceptual framework.  However, this study also used multiple presentations, 
with each word read aloud by the experimenter a total of five times.  That the use multiple 
presentations alone could account for the exceptional finding by Postman and Jenkins is 
supported by the findings of Maisto et al. (1977).  They induced expectation of free recall versus 
recognition via instructions and experience with one practice study-test cycle, and also 
manipulated the number of times that items were presented: one versus three (between-subjects).  
They found that, on a final test of free recall, free-recall-expecting participants reliably 
outperformed recognition-expecting participants only when three presentations were used. 
 Finally, with respect to the stimuli and presentation requirement, it is worth considering 
the use of prose material (i.e., text passages) in test expectancy studies.  Test expectancy effects 
have been found less consistently with prose than with discrete materials such as word lists (cf. 
d’Ydewalle et al., 1983; McDaniel et al., 1994; Oakhill & Davies, 1991).  There are several 
possible reasons for this.  First, memory performance for prose material may be more heavily 
influenced by particular characteristics of the text, such as narrative structure (McDaniel et al.).  
Second, although prose may potentially offer more different ways to encode to-be-remembered 
information than discrete stimuli would, it also introduces opportunities for participants to 
adaptively exercise item selection and study-time allocation for subsets of the prose, thus making 
isolation of encoding strategy effects more difficult.  One way to ameliorate this problem is to 
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use a kind of “moving window” method such that single sentences of a passage are presented one 
at a time, as in McDaniel et al. 
 Dependent measures.  The third and final methodological requirement is that dependent 
measures be sufficiently sensitive and appropriate to detect differences in encoding strategies 
that are relevant to the task demands.  This requirement is consistent with the efforts of some 
researchers to seek evidence of encoding strategy differences not in overall levels of test 
performance (e.g., accuracy) but rather in nuances of performance such as intra-category serial 
position functions (cf. Carey & Lockhart, 1973; Hall et al., 1976) or semantic organization of 
output in free recall (cf. D’Ydewalle, 1982; Jacoby 1973).  However, to the extent that the task 
demands differ—or even better, directly conflict—for the test formats used for expectancy (the 
first methodological requirement), overall final performance on these test formats may well 
suffice as sensitive measures.  This was the case with the few studies that have shown the 
disordinal interaction between test format expected and test format received (including 
Experiment 1 of the present study).  Otherwise, additional measures may be needed that allow 
the decomposition of overall performance along dimensions relevant to likely differences in 
encoding strategy.  For example, in the present study the primary result was the disordinal 
interaction in overall recall performance on the final critical test in Experiment 1; this was 
bolstered by additional final tests of associative recognition (with performance analyzed as a 
function of test expectancy and list of origin), and item recognition (with performance analyzed 
as a function of test expectancy, list of origin, and item type [cues vs. targets]).  In order to 
devise sensitive measures such as these, researchers must already have an idea of what different 
encoding strategies participants are likely to employ.  These may be predicted from theory, from 
previous research, or from pilot studies.  Self-reports from participants may be particularly 
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helpful as well, and can themselves comprise compelling data (cf. Hall et al., 1976; Leonard & 
Whitten, 1983).  Especially where strategy use is concerned, careful use of such qualitative 
methods may enable key insights that using quantitative methods alone cannot (cf. Dunlosky & 
Hertzog, 2001; Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Newell, 1973). 
 A final consideration with respect to the third requirement is that, in many cases, a 
variety of encoding strategies are likely employed across participants in the same expectancy 
conditions, and even within participants.  This implies that, unless task demands of two test 
formats are in direct opposition, there may be qualitative differences in group encoding strategy 
that take the form of different relative proportions of various strategies.  For example, 
participants in the cued-expecting conditions in Experiment 1 of the present study appear to have 
encoded cue-target associations to a greater extent than they selectively attended to the target 
words (but didn’t use either strategy exclusively), while participants in the free-expecting 
conditions appear to have done the opposite.  Such qualitative differences in relative proportion 
of strategy use may not always be reflected in overall final performance (though in this case, 
they were).  Thus, even if the first methodological requirement is met, there may be need for 
measures of final performance that are more sensitive than the expected test formats themselves.  
I believe that a major strength of the current study was the variety of dependent measures used 
and the convergence of results that they provided. 
Future Directions 
 The points covered in the General Discussion may help guide future studies of the 
abilities of learners to adaptively cater their encoding strategies to suit expected task demands.  
The framework I have presented highlights dimensions likely to modulate the amount of 
observed adaptation in encoding strategy.  Alternative forms of metacognitive control, if they are 
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allowed, may overshadow changes or differences in encoding strategy.  To effectively use 
encoding strategies, learners must be equipped with adequate and appropriate metacognitive 
monitoring skills, metacognitive knowledge, and goals, motivations, and beliefs.  Studies using 
test expectancy in search of qualitative differences in encoding strategies should use test formats 
with conflicting task demands, should use stimuli and presentation methods that facilitate 
variations in encoding strategy (including giving participants experience with the task), and 
should make thoughtful use of multiple dependent measures, including self-reports. 
 In addition to incorporating the above considerations, future work should do more to 
systematically characterize and evaluate the variety of encoding strategies that learners may use 
for given tasks and learning material.  For example, Tversksy (1973) proposed that encoding 
strategies may differ in three ways: encoding of more information (quantitative), encoding of 
different kinds of information (qualitative), and encoding of information organized in a different 
manner (qualitative).  Efforts should also be made to better integrate empirical studies of 
encoding strategy with theoretical models and frameworks such as those by Hertzog and 
Dunlosky (2004) and Winne and Hadwin (1998).  Further efforts might be made to model 
specific encoding strategies as mediating variables between expectancy and performance 
(Murayama, 2005), or to formally model optimal encoding strategy use as Son and Sethi (2006) 
have recently done for study-time allocation.  Such coupling of continued empirical work with 
overarching theoretical work should advance our understanding of metacognitive control 
processes in self-regulated learning. 
Conclusion 
 This study used the test expectancy method to investigate adaptive changes in encoding 
strategy in response to experiencing the demands of an upcoming test format.  Recall, 
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recognition, and self-report results demonstrated learners’ abilities to adaptively and qualitatively 
modify their encoding strategies (Experiment 1), metacognitive monitoring (Experiment 2), and 
study-time allocation (Experiment 3) on the basis of the test format they expected (cued recall vs. 
free recall).  In short, learners showed that they can work smarter, not just harder. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Recall Performance in Experiments 1-3 
  List Number 
Test Format n 1 2 3 4 
Experiment 1      
   Cued Recall 50 .52 (.18) .58 (.20) .54 (.23) .55 (.26) 
   Free Recall 50 .16 (.09) .14 (.08) .17 (.11) .21 (.11) 
Experiment 2      
   Cued Recall 53 .61 (.18) .60 (.17) .59 (.23) .53 (.21) 
   Free Recall 50 .19 (.11) .13 (.08) .19 (.18) .21 (.16) 
Experiment 3      
   Cued Recall 85a .71 (.20) .71 (.21) .66 (.21)  
   Free Recall 85a .34 (.24) .43 (.29) .45 (.27)   
Note. aTest format was manipulated within-subjects in Experiment 3. 
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Table 2 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Recall Performance by Associative Strength in Experiments 
1-3 
 List Number 
Test Format and 
Assoc. Strength 1 2 3 4 
Experiment 1 
Cued Recall     
   High Assoc. .63 (.19) .69 (.19) .64 (.24) .63 (.26) 
   Low Assoc. .40 (.22) .46 (.26) .44 (.25) .46 (.28) 
Free Recall     
   High Assoc. .17 (.10) .16 (.10) .17 (.12) .24 (.14) 
   Low Assoc. .15 (.13) .12 (.10) .17 (.14) .19 (.12) 
Experiment 2 
Cued Recall     
   High Assoc. .75 (.20) .75 (.16) .70 (.24) .67 (.25) 
   Low Assoc. .47 (.23) .45 (.22) .47 (.27) .39 (.23) 
Free Recall     
   High Assoc. .22 (.12) .15 (.10) .21 (.17) .23 (.15) 
   Low Assoc. .15 (.13) .11 (.09) .17 (.20) .19 (.18) 
Experiment 3 
Cued Recall     
   High Assoc. .79 (.19) .78 (.21) .75 (.21)  
   Low Assoc. .63 (.23) .64 (.24) .57 (.25)  
Free Recall     
   High Assoc. .34 (.26) .42 (.31) .45 (.29)  
   Low Assoc. .34 (.25) .43 (.29) .45 (.27)  
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Table 3 
Frequencies of Self-reported Encoding Strategies in Experiment 1 
  Expected Test Format   Cued vs. Free 
Encoding Strategy 
Cued 
Recall   
Free 
Recall   z p 
Cue-target Association 27  9  3.75 < .001 
Target-target Association 0  7  -2.74 .006 
Unspecified Association 8  9  -0.27 .790 
Target Focus 3  35  -6.59 < .001 
Mental Imagery 14  7  1.72 .086 
Rote Rehearsal 9  18  -2.03 .043 
Verbalization 7  3  1.33 .182 
Narrative 9  8  0.27 .790 
Personal Significance 6  6  0.00 > .999 
Bizarre 1  2  -0.59 .558 
Action 0  2  -1.43 .153 
Phonetic 2   2   0.00 > .999 
Note. n = 50 for both test formats; statistically significant p-values are shown in boldface 
(Bonferroni corrected alpha level of .0042). 
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Table 4 
Frequencies of Changes to Encoding Strategies that Participants Reported they Would Have 
Made in Experiment 1 
Expected 
Test Format 
Received 
Test Format 
Focus on 
Targets 
Attend More 
to Cues 
Make Cue-
Target 
Associations 
Make Target-
Target 
Associations 
Cued Cued 0 0 1 0 
Cued Free 14 0 1 2 
Free Cued 1 10 6 0 
Free Free 14 1 2 1 
Note. n = 25 for each condition. 
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Table 5 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Associative Recognition Performance in Experiments 1-3 
  List of Origin 
Test Format n 1 2 3 4 5 
Experiment 1 
Cued Recall 21 1.70 (0.88) 2.15 (0.72) 2.13 (0.67) 2.00 (0.81) 1.94 (0.98) 
Free Recall 22 1.55 (0.84) 1.48 (0.79) 0.99 (0.90) 1.03 (1.02) 0.75 (0.97) 
Experiment 2 
Cued Recall 51 2.17 (0.69) 2.17 (0.52) 1.96 (0.84) 2.09 (0.79)  
Free Recall 49 2.07 (0.61) 1.62 (0.96) 1.72 (0.82) 1.44 (0.99)  
Experiment 3 
Cued Recall 77a 1.76 (0.57) 1.71 (0.68) 1.75 (0.51)   
Free Recall 77a 1.34 (0.76) 0.65 (0.84) 0.48 (0.86)   
Note. Experiment 1 data are only from participants who received their expected test format; 
performance measure was d’. aTest format was manipulated within-subjects in Experiment 3. 
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Table 6 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Item Recognition Performance in Experiments 1-2 
  List of Origin 
Test Format 
and Item Type n 1 2 3 4 5 
Experiment 1 
Cued Recall 21      
   Cues  .83 (.14) .89 (.13) .85 (.18) .86 (.15) .84 (.18) 
   Targets  .72 (.21) .76 (.18) .72 (.17) .77 (.19) .71 (.22) 
Free Recall 22      
   Cues  .72 (.21) .68 (.18) .60 (.23) .55 (.29) .50 (.18) 
   Targets  .70 (.23) .60 (.25) .72 (.18) .73 (.16) .73 (.20) 
Experiment 2 
Cued Recall 51      
   Cues  .85 (.16) .88 (.14) .88 (.16) .87 (.15)  
   Targets  .79 (.16) .77 (.18) .78 (.18) .74 (.20)  
Free Recall 49      
   Cues  .69 (.22) .69 (.19) .59 (.22) .52 (.26)  
   Targets  .70 (.17) .61 (.20) .69 (.20) .71 (.21)  
Note. Experiment 1 data are only from participants who received their expected test format; 
performance measure was hit rate; Experiment 3 did not include an item recognition test. 
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Table 7 
Means (and Standard Deviations)of Judgments of Learning in Experiment 2 
  List Number 
Test Format and 
Associative Strength 1 2 3 4 
Cued Recall     
  High Assoc. 2.93 (0.42) 2.86 (0.45) 2.80 (0.52) 2.72 (0.63) 
  Low Assoc. 1.90 (0.35) 2.03 (0.42) 2.06 (0.50) 2.01 (0.49) 
Free Recall     
  High Assoc. 2.96 (0.49) 2.45 (0.55) 2.32 (0.55) 2.17 (0.47) 
  Low Assoc. 2.01 (0.45) 1.89 (0.43) 1.90 (0.50) 1.90 (0.47) 
Note. Response scale was 1 (I am sure I will NOT remember this item.) to 4 (I am sure I WILL 
remember this item.); ncued = 53; nfree = 50. 
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Table 8 
Encoding Strategy Usage Frequency Ratings in Experiment 2 
 
Cued Recall 
Expectation  
Free Recall 
Expectation 
Encoding Strategy M (SD) Mdn  M (SD) Mdn 
Cue-target Association 5.60 (1.92) 6.5  4.96 (1.35) 5 
Target-target Association 2.32 (1.58) 2  3.06 (2.22) 2 
Inter-item Association 2.58 (1.74) 2  2.53 (1.67) 2 
Target Focus 3.24 (1.74) 3.5  4.58 (1.88)b 5b 
Mental Imagery 4.98 (1.87)a 5a  4.59 (2.06) 5 
Rote Rehearsal 4.32 (1.87) 4  5.20 (1.48) 5 
Verbalization 4.12 (2.35) 4.5  3.84 (2.43) 4 
Intra-item Narrative 4.15 (2.03)b 4b  3.88 (2.36) 5 
Inter-item Narrative 3.39 (2.24)a 3a  2.94 (2.41) 1 
Personal Significance 4.86 (1.90) 5.5  4.08 (2.21) 5 
Observation 4.00 (1.81) 4  4.43 (1.69) 4 
Note. Rating scale was 1 (no use) to 7 (extensive use); ncued = 50; nfree = 49. 
an = 49. bn = 48.
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Table 9 
Correlations Between Self-Reported Strategy Use and Changes in Recall Performance Across Lists in Experiment 2 
 Cued Recall  Free Recall  Cued vs. Free 
Encoding Strategy  (SD) 95% CI   (SD) 95% CI  SE 95% CI 
Cue-target Association .28 (.11) [.06, .50]  -.20 (.11) [-.42, .01]  .16 [.18, .79] 
Target-target Association -.03 (.10) [-.23, .17]  .39 (.10) [.20, .57]  .14 [-.69, -.14] 
Inter-item Association -.16 (.12) [-.39, .08]  .23 (.11) [.02, .44]  .16 [-.70, -.07] 
Target Focus -.03 (.10) [-.23, .16]  .51 (.08) [.35, .67]  .13 [-.79, -.29] 
Mental Imagery .25 (.09) [.07, .44]  .04 (.12) [-.19, .27]  .15 [-.08, .51] 
Rote Rehearsal .02 (.12) [-.21, .26]  .05 (.12) [-.18, .28]  .17 [-.36, .30] 
Verbalization .10 (.12) [-.14, .33]  -.05 (.12) [-.28, .18]  .17 [-.18, .48] 
Intra-item Narrative .20 (.10) [.002, .41]  .23 (.12) [-.01, .47]  .16 [-.34, .28] 
Inter-item Narrative .02 (.12) [-.22, .25]  .37 (.10) [.17, .57]  .16 [-.66, -.05] 
Personal Significance .27 (.09) [.10, .45]  .12 (.10) [-.08, .33]  .14 [-.12, .42] 
Observation -.26 (.11) [-.47, -.05]  -.20 (.12) [-.45, .04]  .16 [-.38, .26] 
Note. Correlations are estimated Kendall’s tau-b; ncued = 46, nfree = 48 (between-subjects); 
CI = confidence interval; SE = standard error of the difference between correlation coefficients for cued 
versus free recall; CIs used zα/2 = 1.96 and standard errors calculated as per Woods (2007) using 
consistent variance estimates from Cliff & Charlin (1991); statistically significant CIs are shown in 
boldface.
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Table 10 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Recall Performance by Self-rated Encoding Strategy Usage 
in Experiment 2 
 Cued Recall 
Encoding Strategy and 
Usage Level n List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 Slope 
Cue-target Association       
   High 25 .63 (.20) .63 (.17) .63 (.23) .59 (.22) -.01 (.07) 
   Low 25 .60 (.17) .57 (.16) .55 (.23) .45 (.18) -.05 (.06) 
Target-target Association       
   High 29 .62 (.15) .59 (.16) .58 (.19) .52 (.18) -.03 (.06) 
   Low 21 .61 (.22) .61 (.19) .60 (.29) .53 (.26) -.03 (.08) 
Inter-item Association       
   High 22 .59 (.19) .58 (.18) .52 (.26) .47 (.21) -.04 (.08) 
   Low 28 .64 (.18) .62 (.16) .65 (.20) .56 (.21) -.02 (.06) 
Target Focus       
   High 25 .61 (.17) .60 (.16) .56 (.21) .53 (.20) -.03 (.05) 
   Low 25 .62 (.20) .61 (.18) .62 (.26) .51 (.22) -.03 (.08) 
Mental Imagery       
   High 23 .61 (.17) .59 (.17) .67 (.19) .58 (.19) .00 (.06) 
   Low 26 .62 (.20) .61 (.17) .52 (.25) .48 (.22) -.05 (.07) 
Rote Rehearsal       
   High 24 .65 (.18) .63 (.18) .65 (.21) .55 (.20) -.02 (.05) 
   Low 26 .58 (.18) .58 (.16) .53 (.24) .49 (.22) -.03 (.08) 
Verbalization       
   High 25 .67 (.16) .63 (.19) .66 (.20) .58 (.19) -.02 (.05) 
   Low 25 .56 (.19) .58 (.15) .52 (.25) .46 (.22) -.04 (.08) 
Intra-item Narrative       
   High 23 .62 (.21) .62 (.19) .63 (.29) .57 (.25) -.02 (.08) 
   Low 25 .61 (.16) .59 (.15) .55 (.17) .48 (.17) -.04 (.05) 
Inter-item Narrative       
   High 23 .66 (.17) .61 (.16) .64 (.24) .55 (.21) -.03 (.09) 
   Low 22 .57 (.21) .59 (.19) .55 (.24) .50 (.22) -.03 (.04) 
Personal Significance       
   High 25 .60 (.18) .61 (.16) .63 (.22) .56 (.18) -.01 (.04) 
   Low 25 .63 (.18) .60 (.18) .55 (.25) .48 (.23) -.05 (.08) 
Observation       
   High 30 .62 (.19) .59 (.17) .54 (.24) .47 (.21) -.05 (.07) 
   Low 20 .61 (.17) .61 (.17) .66 (.21) .60 (.19) .00 (.05) 
(Table continues) 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 Free Recall 
Encoding Strategy and 
Usage Level n List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 Slope 
Cue-target Association       
   High 30 .20 (.11) .12 (.06) .14 (.08) .17 (.10) -.01 (.05) 
   Low 19 .18 (.11) .14 (.10) .27 (.26) .27 (.21) .04 (.08) 
Target-target Association       
   High 24 .20 (.13) .13 (.09) .26 (.23) .27 (.19) .03 (.08) 
   Low 25 .18 (.10) .13 (.07) .13 (.08) .15 (.09) -.01 (.04) 
Inter-item Association       
   High 19 .19 (.09) .14 (.09) .24 (.21) .29 (.19) .04 (.07) 
   Low 19 .18 (.07) .13 (.07) .18 (.20) .16 (.11) .00 (.04) 
Target Focus       
   High 25 .16 (.08) .13 (.08) .25 (.23) .26 (.17) .04 (.07) 
   Low 23 .22 (.13) .14 (.08) .12 (.08) .15 (.12) -.02 (.05) 
Mental Imagery       
   High 21 .18 (.09) .16 (.08) .24 (.20) .25 (.20) .03 (.07) 
   Low 28 .20 (.13) .11 (.07) .15 (.16) .18 (.11) .00 (.06) 
Rote Rehearsal       
   High 24 .18 (.09) .13 (.09) .18 (.17) .21 (.13) .01 (.05) 
   Low 25 .19 (.13) .13 (.07) .20 (.20) .20 (.18) .01 (.08) 
Verbalization       
   High 24 .21 (.10) .15 (.09) .20 (.21) .21 (.15) .01 (.05) 
   Low 25 .17 (.12) .12 (.07) .19 (.15) .21 (.17) .02 (.08) 
Intra-item Narrative       
   High 25 .18 (.09) .14 (.08) .22 (.20) .24 (.16) .02 (.05) 
   Low 24 .20 (.13) .12 (.07) .16 (.16) .18 (.15) .00 (.08) 
Inter-item Narrative       
   High 23 .18 (.08) .13 (.08) .25 (.24) .28 (.19) .04 (.07) 
   Low 26 .20 (.13) .13 (.08) .14 (.09) .15 (.10) -.01 (.06) 
Personal Significance       
   High 26 .17 (.09) .13 (.09) .19 (.15) .23 (.17) .03 (.06) 
   Low 23 .22 (.13) .14 (.07) .19 (.21) .18 (.14) .00 (.07) 
Observation       
   High 23 .19 (.14) .12 (.07) .13 (.08) .16 (.09) -.01 (.06) 
   Low 26 .19 (.09) .14 (.08) .24 (.23) .25 (.19) .03 (.07) 
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Table 11 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Study-time Allocation in Experiment 3 
 List Number 
Test Format and 
Associative Strength 1 2 3 
Cued Recall    
   High Assoc. 5.33 (3.54) 4.31 (2.68) 3.59 (1.79) 
   Low Assoc. 6.49 (4.23) 5.39 (3.58) 4.62 (2.77) 
   Overall 5.77 (3.62) 4.83 (3.06) 4.05 (2.27) 
Free Recall    
   High Assoc. 5.63 (4.09) 4.97 (4.19) 3.75 (2.27) 
   Low Assoc. 6.81 (5.07) 5.18 (4.17) 3.70 (2.48) 
   Overall 6.04 (4.41) 5.00 (4.03) 3.63 (2.16) 
Note. Group means were calculated from participant medians; unit of measurement is seconds. 
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Table 12 
Encoding Strategy Usage Frequency Ratings in Experiment 3 
 
Cued Recall 
Expectation  
Free Recall 
Expectation 
Encoding Strategy M (SD) Mdn  M (SD) Mdn 
Cue-target Association 3.67 (0.64) 4  1.58 (0.79)d 1d 
Target-target Association 1.78 (0.92)d 2d  2.76 (1.21)d 3d 
Inter-item Association 1.65 (0.82)a 1a  1.99 (1.13)b 2b 
Target Focus 2.43 (0.91)c 2.5c  3.63 (0.79)d 4d 
Mental Imagery 3.00 (1.10) 3  2.88 (1.18) 3 
Rote Rehearsal 2.63 (1.12) 3  3.07 (1.09) 3 
Verbalization 2.79 (1.24) 3  2.94 (1.26) 4 
Intra-item Narrative 2.75 (1.13) 3  2.61 (1.25)d 3d 
Inter-item Narrative 1.98 (1.13) 1.5  2.62 (1.30) 3 
Personal Significance 2.67 (1.12) 3  2.45 (1.14) 2 
Observation 2.16 (1.08)c 2c  2.35 (1.13)c 2c 
Note. Rating scale was 1 (no use) to 4 (extensive use); N = 84. 
an = 80. bn = 81. cn = 82. dn = 83. 
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Table 13 
Correlations Between Self-Reported Strategy Use and Changes in Recall Performance Across Lists in Experiment 3 
   Cued Recall  Free Recall  Cued vs. Free 
Encoding Strategy N   (SD) 95% CI   (SD) 95% CI  SE 95% CI 
Cue-target Association 83  -.03 (.09) [-.21, .15]  -.11 (.09) [-.29, .07]  .13 [-.17, .33] 
Target-target Association 82  -.03 (.09) [-.20, .14]  .22 (.08) [.06, .37]  .12 [-.49, -.01] 
Inter-item Association 80  -.12 (.09) [-.30, .06]  .12 (.08) [-.05, .28]  .12 [-.48, .01] 
Target Focus 81  .15 (.09) [-.03, .33]  .14 (.09) [-.03, .31]  .13 [-.24, .26] 
Mental Imagery 84  .03 (.09) [-.14, .20]  -.001 (.09) [-.18, .17]  .12 [-.21, .27] 
Rote Rehearsal 84  -.11 (.08) [-.27, .05]  -.16 (.08) [-.31, -.001]  .12 [-.19, .29] 
Verbalization 84  -.07 (.09) [-.25, .10]  -.19 (.08) [-.35, -.04]  .13 [-.14, .38] 
Intra-item Narrative 83  -.06 (.08) [-.22, .10]  .03 (.08) [-.13, .20]  .13 [-.34, .16] 
Inter-item Narrative 84  -.13 (.09) [-.31, .04]  .21 (.09) [.04, .38]  .13 [-.59, -.09] 
Personal Significance 84  .03 (.09) [-.15, .21]  -.07 (.08) [-.23, .08]  .12 [-.14, .35] 
Observation 81  -.03 (.09) [-.21, .15]  -.13 (.08) [-.29, .03]  .13 [-.15, .34] 
Note. Correlations are estimated Kendall’s tau-b (within-subjects); CI = confidence interval; SE = standard error of the 
difference between correlation coefficients for cued versus free recall; CIs used zα/2 = 1.96 and standard errors 
calculated as per Woods (2007) using consistent variance estimates from Cliff & Charlin (1991); statistically 
significant CIs are shown in boldface. 
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Table 14 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Encoding Strategy Usage Frequency Ratings by Level of Recall Performance Improvement in 
Experiment 3 
 High Improvers  Low Improvers 
Encoding Strategy Cued Recall Free Recall Free - Cued  Cued Recall Free Recall Free - Cued 
Cue-target Association 3.83 (0.37) 1.44 (0.68) -2.39 (0.79)  3.53 (0.80) 1.72 (0.93) -1.81 (1.33) 
Target-target Association 1.58 (0.64) 3.00 (1.08) 1.42 (1.30)  2.03 (1.12) 2.67 (1.22) 0.64 (1.67) 
Inter-item Association 1.53 (0.64) 1.94 (1.05) 0.42 (1.06)  1.75 (0.98) 1.97 (1.17) 0.22 (1.16) 
Target Focus 2.67 (0.82) 3.75 (0.72) 1.08 (1.11)  2.36 (0.95) 3.56 (0.80) 1.19 (1.22) 
Mental Imagery 3.08 (1.09) 2.86 (1.23) -0.22 (1.23)  2.92 (1.11) 2.92 (1.14) 0.00 (0.62) 
Rote Rehearsal 2.53 (1.19) 2.89 (1.12) 0.36 (1.03)  2.75 (1.14) 3.33 (1.03) 0.58 (0.79) 
Verbalization 2.53 (1.28) 2.64 (1.34) 0.11 (0.84)  2.94 (1.22) 3.22 (1.16) 0.28 (0.56) 
Intra-item Narrative 2.78 (1.16) 2.61 (1.28) -0.17 (1.64)  2.69 (1.15) 2.58 (1.21) -0.11 (0.91) 
Inter-item Narrative 1.92 (1.11) 2.94 (1.27) 1.03 (1.52)  2.11 (1.17) 2.36 (1.25) 0.25 (1.21) 
Personal Significance 2.78 (1.06) 2.50 (1.14) -0.28 (1.15)  2.50 (1.12) 2.39 (1.16) -0.11 (0.81) 
Observation 2.08 (1.09) 2.22 (1.08) 0.14 (0.82)  2.28 (1.07) 2.53 (1.14) 0.25 (0.72) 
Note. Rating scale was 1 (no use) to 4 (extensive use); nhigh = 36; nlow = 36.
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Table 15 
Differential Efficacy and Use of Encoding Strategies in Experiments 1-3 
 Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3 
Encoding Strategy Use  Efficacy Use  Efficacy Use 
Cue-target Association C  C C  – C 
Target-target Association ~F  F F  F F 
Inter-item Association   F –  ~F – 
Target Focus F  F F  – F 
Mental Imagery        
Rote Rehearsal   – F  – F 
Verbalization        
Intra-item Narrative        
Inter-item Narrative   F –  F F 
Personal Significance        
Observation        
Note. C = reliably greater for cued versus free recall; F = reliably greater for free versus cued 
recall; ~F = marginally reliably greater for free versus cued recall; empty cell = no reliable 
difference; dash = no reliable difference when there was a corresponding reliable difference for 
efficacy or use. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Mean final recall performance as a function of received test format (cued vs. free) and 
expected test format (cued vs. free) in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent the pooled standard 
errors for comparison of expectancy conditions within each received test format. 
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Figure 2.  Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-4) and test format (cued vs. 
free) in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 3.  Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-4), test format (cued vs. free), 
and associative strength (high vs. low) in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 4.  Mean associative recognition performance (d’) as a function of test expectancy (cued 
vs. free) and list of origin of word pairs (1-5) in Experiment 1, for participants receiving their 
expected test format. 
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Figure 5.  Mean item recognition performance (d’) as a function of test expectancy (cued vs. 
free) and item type (cues vs. targets) in Experiment 1, for participants receiving their expected 
test format. Error bars represent standard errors of each cell. 
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Figure 6.  Mean item recognition performance (hit rate) as a function of test expectancy (cued 
vs. free), item type (cues vs. targets), and list of origin for items (1-5) in Experiment 1, for 
participants receiving their expected test format. 
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Figure 7. Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-4) and test format (cued vs. 
free) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 8.  Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-4), test format (cued vs. free), 
and associative strength (high vs. low) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 9.  Mean JOLs as a function of list number (1-4), test format (cued vs. free), and 
associative strength (high vs. low) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 10.  Histograms of usage frequency ratings (1 = no use, 7 = extensive use) for four 
encoding strategies as a function of test format (cued vs. free) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 11.  Mean associative recognition performance (d’) as a function of test expectancy (cued 
vs. free) and list of origin of word pairs (1-5) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 12.  Mean item recognition performance (d’) as a function of test expectancy (cued vs. 
free) and item type (cues vs. targets) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of 
each cell. 
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Figure 13.  Mean item recognition performance (hit rate) as a function of test expectancy (cued 
vs. free), item type (cues vs. targets), and list of origin for items (1-5) in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 14. Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-4), test format (cued vs. 
free), and usage (high vs. low) of six encoding strategies, in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 15.  Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-3) and test format (cued vs. 
free) in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 16.  Mean recall performance as a function of list number (1-3), test format (cued vs. 
free), and associative strength (high vs. low) in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 17.  Mean of participant median study-time allocation (in seconds) as a function of list 
number (1-3) and test format (cued vs. free) in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 18.  Mean of participant median study-time allocation (in seconds) as a function of list 
number (1-3), test format (cued vs. free), and associative strength (high vs. low) in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 19.  Histograms of usage frequency ratings (1 = no use, 4 = extensive use) for five 
encoding strategies as a function of test format (cued vs. free) in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 20. Mean associative recognition performance (d’) as a function of test format (cued vs. 
free) and list of origin of word pairs (1-3) in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 21.  Mean difference in usage frequency rating for free versus cued recall, for high 
improvers versus low improvers, for six encoding strategies, in Experiment 3.  Error bars 
represent the pooled standard error for comparison of improvement groups. 
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Appendix A 
Encoding Strategy Categories Identified in Experiment 1 
Encoding Strategy  Characteristic Response 
Cue-target 
Association 
 I tried to find some connection between the two 
words that were paired 
Target-target 
Association 
 ...I started associating the second word from each 
pair together… 
Unspecified 
Association 
 ...i just tried to associate the words 
Target Focus  ...towards the end I just started memorizing the last 
word and not really paying attention to the first 
word. 
Mental Imagery  I tried to visualize a picture for each of the words. 
Rote Rehearsal  I attempted to repeat the words over in my head.  
Verbalization  ...I was trying to just say the words outloud to 
remember them... 
Narrative  ...I tried to remember the words based on events 
and a story that I would make up. 
Personal 
Significance 
 ...i tried to match the words with something or 
someone i know… 
Bizarre  I always try to remember the words in completly 
outlandish situations. 
Action  ... i tried to act out both words… 
Phonetic  i also tried to remember words that began with the 
same letter. 
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Appendix B 
Encoding Strategies Listed in Questionnaire in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Strategy Label Full Text Used in Questionnaire 
Cue-target 
association 
Made associations between the left-hand and right-
hand word in a pair. 
Target-target 
association 
Made associations between the right-hand words 
across multiple pairs. 
Inter-item 
association 
Made associations between multiple pairs across a 
list. 
Target focus Focused more on the right-hand words. 
Mental 
imagery 
Used mental imagery (formed a picture in your 
head). 
Rote rehearsal Repeated individual words or pairs over and over. 
Verbalization Spoke words out loud or under your breath. 
Intra-item 
narrative 
Used a single pair or word in a sentence, phrase, or 
story. 
Inter-item 
narrative 
Used groups of pairs or words across a list in a 
sentence, phrase, or story. 
Personal 
significance 
Related words to something personally significant. 
Observation Just read or looked at the words. 
Note. Adapted from Hall Grossman, and Elwood (1976) and Leonard and Whitten (1983). 
Strategy labels are for reference and were not used in the questionnaire. 
